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Note
THE FRIENDLY SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
AND BANS ON MALE CIRCUMCISION
MICHAEL J. WEIL
In 2011, San Francisco placed a measure to outlaw infant male
circumcision on its November ballot. Members of the Jewish and Muslim
faiths practice infant male circumcision as a tenet of their religions. If
approved, this ballot measure would have raised serious questions about
the scope of religious liberty protected under the Constitution. This Note
argues that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits
governments from, at minimum, outlawing religious practices—at least not
without satisfying the elements of strict scrutiny. This Note will undertake
a critical analysis of the United States Supreme Court’s concept of
neutrality as has been applied to religious practice and will advance an
argument for the theory of “substantive neutrality.” Given that the San
Francisco Ballot Measure fails to satisfy the substantive neutrality
principle, and further that a circumcision ban does not serve a compelling
state interest, the proposal would not be upheld under the rule advocated
for in this Note.
Part II of this Note will provide a brief background of the religious
motivations and social constructions of male circumcision and the medical
debate over the procedure. Part III discusses the text and legislative
motives of the San Francisco Ballot Measure. Subsequently, Part IV of
this Note summarizes the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
Part V will analyze how a court considering the San Francisco Ballot
Measure would apply these cases to the proposal, and it will show why
analysis confined to the present rule is constitutionally deficient. Finally,
the Note argues that substantive neutrality is the correct formulation of the
neutrality requirement, and that the San Francisco Ballot Measure violates
the principle.
695

NOTE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 697
II. BACKGROUND: MALE CIRCUMCISION ......................................... 700
A. RELIGIOUS MOTIVATIONS ................................................................... 700
B. THE CULTURAL NORM OF MALE CIRCUMCISION ................................. 703
C. MEDICAL ARGUMENTS ........................................................................ 704
III. THE SAN FRANCISCO BALLOT MEASURE .................................. 706
A. CHRONOLOGY AND TEXT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BALLOT
MEASURE ........................................................................................ 707
B. MGM BILL AND CHARGES OF ANTI-SEMITISM ................................... 709
IV. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE ................................ 710
A. EARLY CASES INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ................ 710
B. SHERBERT, YODER, AND THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST .................. 713
C. THE MODERN REGIME UNDER SMITH AND LUKUMI ............................. 716
V. THE SAN FRANCISCO BALLOT MEASURE, THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE, AND SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY............................... 720
A. GENERAL APPLICABILITY AND NEUTRALITY ....................................... 720
B. COMPELLING INTEREST TEST .............................................................. 736
C. HYBRID CLAIM .................................................................................... 739
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 741

THE FRIENDLY SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
AND BANS ON MALE CIRCUMCISION
MICHAEL J. WEIL
God . . . said to Abraham, “As for you, you and your
offspring to come throughout the ages shall keep [m]y
covenant . . . . [E]very male among you shall be
circumcised. You shall circumcise the flesh of your
foreskin and that shall be the sign of the covenant between
Me and you. And throughout the generations, every male
among you shall be circumcised at the age of eight days.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
For the entirety of my faith’s existence, Jewish people have
circumcised their sons,2 both in times of normalcy and in times of great
adversity, persecution, and death. The ritual of circumcision survived the
Roman conquest,3 the Babylonian conquest,4 and even the concentration

* The George Washington University, B.A., magna cum laude, 2008; University of Connecticut
School of Law, J.D., 2013. I would like to thank Professor Gordon Silverstein for his helpful feedback
throughout the drafting of this Note. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Bena’ and Steven Weil, for
their unyielding love and steadfast support. I would also like to thank Irina Lisker for her invaluable
research assistance and unwavering encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the
Connecticut Law Review for their tireless efforts throughout the editing of this Note. Any errors
contained herein are mine and mine alone.
1
Genesis 17:9–12; see also Leviticus 12:2–3 (“When a woman at childbirth bears a male . . . [o]n
the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.”). All biblical citations are from TANAKH:
A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT
(1985).
2
See Aaron Glantz, Increasingly, A Ritual Is Bypassed, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at A17
(stating that Jewish parents have circumcised boys for thousands of years, following a biblical
commandment); Brad A. Greenberg, The Circumcision Wars, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2011, at A13 (“This
custom [of circumcision] is as old as Judaism itself.”); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision:
Cultural-Legal Analysis, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 497, 513 (2002) (“The Israelites practiced the
custom beginning, according to the book of Genesis, with the circumcision of Abraham at age ninetynine.” (citing Genesis 17:24)).
3
See DAVID L. GOLLAHER, CIRCUMCISION: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL
SURGERY 15 (2000) (describing efforts by the Jews during the Roman Era to convince Roman leaders
to allow the practice of infant male circumcision to continue); see also LEONARD B. GLICK, MARKED IN
YOUR FLESH: CIRCUMCISION FROM ANCIENT JUDEA TO MODERN AMERICA 31 (2005) (“Although Jews
in the Roman Empire knew that others considered circumcision barbarous, most Jewish fathers acceded
to what they believed was a divine mandate.”); Miller, supra note 2, at 517 (describing the Bar Kohbha
rebellion and the Roman Emperor’s futile attempt to bar circumcision).
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5

camps of Nazi Europe. Muslims also practice circumcision as a religious
rite.6 Recently, “Inactivists”7 in San Francisco proposed a city ordinance
to criminalize nearly all forms of circumcision performed on males under
age eighteen.8 Marc Stern, associate general counsel for legal advocacy for
the American Jewish Committee, referred to the proposal as “the most
direct assault on Jewish religious practice in the United States. . . . It’s
unprecedented in American Jewish life.”9
Aside from representing a “direct assault” on Jewish and Muslim
religious practice, the proposal raises serious and fundamental questions
about the extent of religious liberty in the United States today. The United
States, it has been said, enjoys a “friendly” separation of church and state.10
Alexis de Tocqueville made a similar observation, commenting:
I have expressed enough to characterize Anglo-American
civilization in its true colors. This civilization is the result
. . . of two quite distinct ingredients, which anywhere else
have often ended in war but which Americans have
succeeded somehow to meld together in wondrous harmony;
namely the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty. . . . Far
from harming each other, these two inclinations, despite their
apparent opposition, seem to walk in mutual agreement and
4
See GOLLAHER, supra note 3, at 15 (“Antiochus Epiphanes, the draconian rules of Judea during
the second century B.C., imposed severe penalties for circumcision as part of his assault on Judaism.”
(citation omitted)).
5
See Michael Gerson, Making Circumcision Criminal, WASH. POST, July 6, 2012, at A17
(describing a circumcision at the Janowska Concentration Camp in Poland); Israel Spira, The Nazi
Accomplice in Circumcision, CHABAD.ORG, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/2619/jewis
h/The-Nazi-Accomplice-in-the-Circumcision.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
6
See infra Part II.A.2.
7
“Inactivist” is the term by which members of the anti-circumcision movement refer to
themselves. See, e.g., Mikaela Conley, Circumcision Ban to Appear on San Francisco Municipal
Election Ballot, ABC NEWS (May 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/san-francisco-votecircumcision-ban/story?id=13638220#.UGYyT6RSTcY [hereinafter Conley, Circumcision Ban]
(defining “inactivists” as “people who believe that infant boys have the right to keep their foreskin
intact”).
8
See Initiative Measure to Be Submitted Directly to the Voters: Genital Cutting of Male Minors
(proposed Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/candidates/2011Mal
eCircumcision.pdf [hereinafter San Francisco Ballot Measure]. The measure was removed from the
ballot on July 28, 2011 by judicial order. See Maria L. La Ganga, San Francisco Is Ordered to Halt
Circumcision Vote, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at AA5 [hereinafter La Ganga, Judge Orders] (stating
that a court removed the initiative from the November 2011 ballot because it was preempted by state
law).
9
Conley, Circumcision Ban, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10
PHILIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES OR THE AMERICAN IDEA OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND ITS PRACTICAL EFFECTS 10 (Arno Press 1972) (1888) (“Such liberty is
impossible on the basis of a union of church and state, where the one of necessity restricts and controls
the other. It requires a friendly separation, where each power is entirely independent in its own
sphere.”).
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support.

How is it that this unique character of religious liberty described by
Tocqueville and later Schaff came into being? It can at least partially be
attributed to the dualities of religious freedoms protected by the First
Amendment: The state is forbidden from showing favoritism to any one
religion12 and concomitantly is prohibited from interfering with any
individual’s or group’s religious exercise.13
These pages explore the contours and boundaries of the Supreme
Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence as applied to the San Francisco
Ballot Measure, focusing on two cases in particular: Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith14 and Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.15 This Note argues that the
Free Exercise Clause means that, at minimum, governments may not
outlaw religious practices—at least not without satisfying the elements of
strict scrutiny (a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means).16
This Note will undertake a critical analysis of the Court’s concept of
neutrality as has been applied to religious practice and will advance an
argument for the theory of “substantive neutrality.”17 Given that the San
Francisco Ballot Measure fails to satisfy the substantive neutrality
principle, and since there is no compelling state interest served by a
circumcision ban, the proposal would not be upheld under the rule
advocated for by this Note.
Part II of this Note will provide a brief background of the religious
11
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 55–56 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., Penguin
Books 2003) (1840).
12
See U.S. CONST. amend. I [hereinafter Establishment Clause] (“Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.” (emphasis added)); see also Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S.
1, 15–16 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . ‘In the words of Jefferson, the Clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and
State.’”(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878))).
13
See U.S. CONST. amend. I [hereinafter Free Exercise Clause] (“Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)).
14
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
16
The religion clauses of the First Amendment have been incorporated by the Court under the
Fourteenth Amendment and are binding on the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940); see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
149 (2d ed. 1994) (“In 1940, when the Supreme Court incorporated the free-exercise clause into the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court assumed that the establishment clause imposed upon the states the
same restraints as upon the United States.”).
17
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Formal] (noting that substantive neutrality
understands the religion clauses to “require government to minimize the extent to which it either
encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or
nonobservance”).
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motivations and social constructions of male circumcision and the medical
debate over the procedure. Part III discusses the text and legislative
motives of the San Francisco ballot measure. Subsequently, Part IV of this
Note summarizes the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. Here it
is shown that, prior to Smith and Lukumi, the Court applied substantive
neutrality when analyzing cases under the Free Exercise Clause. Part V
will analyze how a court considering the San Francisco Ballot Measure
would apply the rules elucidated in Smith and Lukumi to the proposal, and
it will show why analysis confined to these decisions is constitutionally
deficient. Here it is argued that substantive neutrality is the correct
formulation of the neutrality requirement, and that the San Francisco Ballot
Measure violates this principle.
II. BACKGROUND: MALE CIRCUMCISION
“Circumcision is the removal of a simple fold of skin—the ‘prepuce’
(or ‘foreskin’)—that covers the glans (head) of the flaccid penis.”18 This
section provides a background discussion on the religious, cultural, and
medical ideas and controversies surrounding male circumcision.
A. Religious Motivations
1. Judaism and the Berit Milah19
In Judaism, the obligation of male circumcision is found in Genesis
(the first book of the Pentateuch).20 The biblical text teaches that God
appeared to Abram at age ninety-nine to “establish My covenant between
Me and you.”21 Under the covenant, God promised Abraham and his
offspring all the land of Canaan (biblical Israel). In exchange for God’s
promise, the Jewish people were instructed to “circumcise the flesh of your
foreskin.”22
This covenant established between God and Abraham is central to
Jewish theology. In fact, Genesis mandates that uncircumcised men be

18
Brian J. Morris, Why Circumcision Is a Biomedical Imperative for the 21st Century, 29
BIOESSAYS 1147, 1147 (2007).
19
“Berit milah” translates from Hebrew to “covenant of circumcision.” GOLLAHER, supra note 3,
at 24. “The first stage of a ritual circumcision—the initial cut—is called by the Hebrew term milah.
The Hebrew word for ‘covenant,’ in the Sephardic pronunciation now used in Israel, is brit—hence that
term brit milah.” GLICK, supra note 3, at 6.
20
The Pentateuch includes the first five books of the Hebrew Bible attributed to Moses: Genesis,
Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. STEPHEN PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY: WHAT
EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW—AND DOESN’T 162 (2007).
21
Genesis 17:1–2.
22
Id. 17:11.
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cast out of the community. The ritual of circumcision must occur during
the daylight hours of the child’s eighth day of life24 and takes precedence
over other religious obligations, including the obligation to refrain from
labor on the Sabbath or Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year.25
One scholar has offered this description of a typical bris26:
The bris is a joyous occasion to which guests are invited
from near and far. If possible, ten men constitute a minyan,
or quorum required under religious law, to conduct worship
services. The parents select a godmother and a godfather
(sandak) for the ceremony. The mother hands the child to the
godmother, who in turn passes him to the godfather, whose
job is to hold the child during the miloh (cutting). The ritual
expert, or mohel, performs the operation and recites the
prescribed prayers. At the mezizah, the traditional (but now
largely abandoned) culmination of the ritual, the mohel sips
wine and sucks the infant's penis, spitting the mixture of
blood and wine into a glass. Afterwards, the assembled
crowd joins in a festive meal, the suedo shel mitzvo.27
Aside from (or perhaps divorced from) the religious obligation,
circumcision is a form of expressive conduct in the Jewish faith, signifying
one’s Jewish identity and place in the religion (and that of his or her
child).28 “A circumcised penis is a symbol of identity among Jews; it
distinguishes the Jew from the non-Jews. It not only signifies the
covenant, but also signifies a people that have suffered persecution
throughout the ages.”29 This suggests that rather than being merely a
Halakhic obligation, circumcision carries great cultural significance for
Jewish people. For example, Leonard Glick argues that “Jews expect boys
to be circumcised, simply as a time-honored ethnic custom, divorced from
Id. 17:14 (“[I]f any male who is uncircumcised fails to circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, that
person shall be cut off from his kin; he has broken My covenant.”).
24
Miller, supra note 2, at 514 (stating that Jewish tradition holds that circumcision shall occur on
the eighth day after birth).
25
GOLLAHER, supra note 3, at 24; Greenberg, supra note 2, at A13.
26
“Bris” is the term familiar to most Americans to describe the circumcision ritual. GLICK, supra
note 3, at 6.
27
Miller, supra note 2, at 514. Glick’s description of the Jewish circumcision ritual is less
sanguine. See GLICK, supra note 3, at 7–8 (describing the Jewish circumcision ritual).
28
Miller, supra note 2, at 521 (“For Jews, circumcision was by far the most salient mark of
identity—it was the feature that distinguished a Jew from other peoples, a covenant demanded by God
for all Jews. Circumcision, said Maimonides, was a reliable indicator of a person’s Jewish identity
because it was painful. . . . Circumcision for Jews was an essential mark of self and, accordingly, was
highly esteemed within Jewish culture.”); see also GLICK, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that for many
Jewish parents, circumcision “somehow helps to ‘make the boy Jewish’”).
29
Abbie J. Chessler, Comment, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 555,
584 (1997).
23
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2. Islam and Male Circumcision
Although never mentioned in the Qur’an, circumcision is widely
practiced among Islamic people as a religious obligation;31 the ritual has
been part of the Islamic tradition since the ninth century.32
Unlike the strict eight days of Judaism, the time when the procedure is
performed among Muslims is not uniform.33 Circumcision is sometimes
performed only once the boy is able to read the Qur’an.34 Other Muslims
perform the ritual during the child’s infancy, perhaps as early as the
seventh day of life35 while still others perform the circumcision during
puberty.36
3. Christianity and Circumcision
Christianity has never required circumcision as an act of religious
faith.37 Early Christians rejected circumcision, and its significance became
a mark of distinction between Christians and non-Christians.38
Recognizing that importing circumcision into Christianity would be
unpalatable and hurt his evangelizing efforts, the Apostle Paul excised the
practice from the new religion, explaining that Jesus had subsumed the old
covenant between God and Abraham, which rendered circumcision
irrelevant.39
According to one scholar, “The Church abandoned
circumcision under the doctrine that Christ had abolished circumcision and

30
GLICK, supra note 3, at 9. Glick estimates that less than ten percent of Jews who practice
circumcision are strictly observant, or are even aware of the Biblical covenant. Id.
31
See GLICK, supra note 3, at 5.
32
Id. at 317 n.80; see also Chessler, supra note 29, at 585 (“Most Muslims consider circumcision
essential and a sunna, an action of the prophet, which indicates that all past prophets performed it.
There are many narrative reports which demonstrate that circumcision was a sunna at the time of
Muhammad.”).
33
See GOLLAHER, supra note 3, at 46 (noting that Muslim clerics have never agreed on a
standardized time for the ritual); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 514 (stating there is no set time for
circumcision in Islamic cultures, but the procedure must occur before the male reaches adulthood).
34
Chessler, supra note 29, at 585.
35
GLICK, supra note 3, at 283 n.3 (“Although the Muslim code of religious law (shariah)
recommends performance of circumcision at the age of seven days, this is seldom followed.”).
36
Thirteen years of age is generally taken as the latest acceptable age for circumcision among
Muslims. Abraham circumcised Ishmael, the putative father of the Arab people, at age thirteen. Id.
37
Miller, supra note 2, at 517.
38
See GLICK, supra note 3, at 6 (“Until fairly recently Christians not only rejected but often
vilified circumcision; from Paul’s time onward they interpreted the practice as prime evidence that
Judaism was so fixated on irrelevant physical concerns that spiritual life was beyond reach.”); Miller,
supra note 2, at 518 (stating that circumcision “became a mark, for Christians, of how they were
different from Jews”).
39
GLICK, supra note 3, at 36–37; see also Miller, supra note 2, at 517 (“Paul, the apostle to the
Gentiles, viewed circumcision as meaningless and irrelevant.”).
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other ritual separations between Jew and Gentile.” For Christians, the
rite of initiation (for both males and females) is the baptism.41
40

B. The Cultural Norm of Male Circumcision
Circumcision ranks amongst the most common surgical procedures
performed on newborn males worldwide42 and in 2005, it was the third
most commonly performed surgery in the United States.43 Hospitals in the
U.S. performed more than 1.2 million circumcisions in 2005.44
The procedure is common internationally, as “[g]lobally over 25% of
men are circumcised.”45 Rates of circumcision in the United States have
declined from their peak during the 1950s when 90% of newborn males
were circumcised in response to advice from the medical community about
the procedure’s beneficial effects.46 According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”), in 1999, 65% of all males born in U.S.
hospitals were circumcised.47 That number fell to 56% of newborns prior
to leaving the hospital in 2005,48 with some reports suggesting the number
might be even lower.49 Among Jewish American men, 98% have been
circumcised.50 Since Jews and Muslims comprise approximately 3% of the
U.S. population, it has been estimated that only 10% of the circumcisions
performed in the U.S. are religiously motivated.51
40

Miller, supra note 2, at 517–18.
GLICK, supra note 3, at 6–7.
42
See Circumcision (Male), MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/circumcision/MY
01023 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (“Circumcision is fairly common for newborn boys in certain parts of
the world, including the United States.”). But see GLICK, supra note 3, at 4–5 (stating that the United
States stands apart from the world in widespread circumcision of male newborns).
43
Chaya T. Merrill et al., Statistical Brief #45: Circumcisions Performed in U.S. Community
Hospitals, 2005, HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT (HCUP) (Jan. 2008),
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb45.jsp [hereinafter Merrill, Statistical Brief #45].
44
Id.
45
Morris, supra note 18, at 1147.
46
Edward Guthmann, Circumcision Losing Favor with U.S. Parents, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2007,
at A1.
47
NCHS Health E-Stat: Trends in Circumcisions Among Newborns, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/circumcisions/circumcisions.htm (last
updated Feb. 3, 2010).
48
Merill, supra note 43.
49
Officials from the CDC presented findings at the International AIDS Conference in Vienna in
2010 suggesting that just 32.5% of boys born in conventional hospitals were circumcised in 2009.
Roni Caryn Rabin, Steep Drop Seen in Circumcisions in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, at D6.
50
Glantz, supra note 2; see also Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to
Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Children?: The
Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 91 (1999)
(stating that circumcision is “almost universal among Jewish men”). No figure for the rate of
circumcision among Muslims or Christians could be obtained.
51
See Eugene Volokh, Proposed San Francisco Circumcision Ban (with No Discussion of
Religious Freedom in this Post), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 23, 2011, 11:24 AM),
http://volokh.com/2011/05/23/proposed-san-francisco-circumcision-ban-with-no-discussion-of41
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Despite its decline, circumcision remains the cultural norm in the
United States.52 Given the ubiquity of the procedure and the social norms
associated with circumcision, it is unsurprising that American parents are
concerned that their son’s genitals look like “everyone else’s.”53 “Many
focus on cosmetic justifications [for circumcisions], saying that they want
their son to feel ‘comfortable’ among other boys in locker rooms, or that a
boy should ‘look like’ his father.”54
C. Medical Arguments
Advocates for and opponents of circumcision have debated, and
continue to debate, the relative benefits and harms of circumcision.
Medical evidence establishes that circumcision is correlated with lower
the occurrences of urinary tract infections (“UTI”) in infants;55 circumcised
men experience lower rates of penile and other cancers;56 and circumcised
men suffer from fewer sexually transmitted infections,57 including human
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (“HIV”/
AIDS”).58
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) reports that
religious-freedom-in-this-post (estimating that 90% of circumcisions are not religiously motivated); see
also Povenmire, supra note 50, at 91 (“The vast majority of circumcisions in the United States,
however, are upon non-Jewish and non-Muslim men.”).
52
See Miller, supra note 2, at 502 (“Circumcision of boys remains normative [in American
culture], and the cultural revisionism of anti-circumcision norm entrepreneurs remains at the fringes of
American public discourse.”).
53
Chessler, supra note 29, at 581. “Circumcised fathers are obsessed with conformity, wanting
their child’s penis also to be circumcised. They worry about the social problems an uncircumcised
child may confront as he matures.” Id. A 1987 study referenced by Volokh lists the following reasons
for non-medical circumcision: the father being circumcised (11%); not wanting the son to look
different from the father (18%); and “I just think it should be done” (9%). Volokh, supra note 51.
54
GLICK, supra note 3, at 7.
55
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 18, at 1151 (stating there is a 2.5% incidence of urinary tract
infection in uncircumcised boys, as compared to a 0.2% incidence in circumcised boys); Aaron A.R.
Tobian & Ronald H. Gray, The Medical Benefits of Male Circumcision, 306 JAMA 1479, 1480 (2011);
Kimberly K. Updegrove, An Evidence-Based Approach to Male Circumcision: What Do We Know?, 46
J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 415, 416 (2001) (noting that the incidence of UTI in
uncircumcised males is twelve times higher than among circumcised men).
56
Morris, supra note 18, at 1151 (stating that uncircumcised men have a twenty-two times higher
incidence of penile cancer and a 1.6 to 2.0 times higher incidence of prostate cancer than circumcised
men); Tobian & Gray, supra note 55, at 1479; Updegrove, supra note 55, at 419.
57
Morris, supra note 18, at 1150, 1151 (stating that circumcision provides “substantial
protection” from the sexually transmitted diseases syphilis, chancroid, herpes, and human
papillomavirus (“HPV”)); Tobian & Gray, supra note 55, at 1479 (acknowledging that two trials
demonstrated that circumcision reduces the risk of acquiring genital herpes by 28% to 34% and highrisk types of HPV by 32% to 35%); Updegrove, supra note 55 at 418 (estimating that the relative risk
of an uncircumcised man contracting gonorrhea and herpes is twice as high for uncircumcised men and
fives times higher for candida and syphilis).
58
See, e.g., Gray & Tobian, supra note 55, at 1479 (asserting that consistent with observational
studies in Africa and the United States, studies in Africa show a 51% to 60% decrease in HIV
acquisition in circumcised men); Morris, supra note 18, at 1150 (finding that circumcision provides a
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circumcision has been shown to lower men’s risk of contracting HIV by up
to 60%, and it is now recommended as part of a comprehensive program to
eradicate HIV/AIDS in Africa.59
Citing insufficient medical data, the American Academy of Pediatrics
(“AAP”) does not presently recommend the procedure.60 In its policy
statement, the AAP notes that “[i]n the case of circumcision, in which there
are potential benefits and risks, yet the procedure is not essential to the
child’s current wellbeing, parents should determine what is in the best
interest of the child.”61 Further, in making this decision, “[i]t is legitimate
for parents to take into account cultural, religious, and ethnic traditions, in
addition to the medical factors.”62 Similarly, the CDC has not taken a
position on the procedure.63
Opponents of circumcision argue that it should be outlawed because
removing thousands of healthy nerve endings64 on the infant is
excruciatingly painful.65 Other common criticisms of the procedure are
that it can involve surgical complications (such as infection, hemorrhaging,
and scarring);66 that it can lead to disfigurement or loss of all or part of the
two-to-eight-fold protection against HIV infection and circumcision led to a 56% to 75% risk
reduction); Updegrove, supra note 55, at 418 (acknowledging that circumcision provides an average
two-to-three-fold reduction in the prevalence of HIV; as much as an 8.2-fold reduction has been
reported).
59
WORLD HEALTH ORG., TRADITIONAL MALE CIRCUMCISION IN THE CONTEXT OF HIV
PREVENTION 8 (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/meetingrep
ort_tmc_apr10/en/index.html.
60
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS 686, 691 (1999),
available at http://www.cirp.org/library/statements/aap1999.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Status of CDC Male Circumcision
Recommendations, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/research/male-circumcision.htm (last updated Aug.
27, 2009).
64
See Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author (Oct. 31, 2011, 4:58 EST)
(on file with author) (writing that “[c]ircumcision of either gender removes thousands of nerve endings
and interferes with normal sexual function”).
65
See Mark C. Alanis & Richard S. Lucidi, Neonatal Circumcision: A Review of the World’s
Oldest and Most Controversial Operation, 59 OBSTETRICAL GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY 379, 388
(2004) (stating that the belief that circumcision causes minor amounts of pain has been proven false);
Stephen Moses et al., Male Circumcision: Assessment of Health Benefits and Risks, 74 SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS, 368, 371 (1998) (stating that “infants undergoing circumcision without
anesthesia demonstrate physiological responses suggesting that they are experiencing pain and
behavioral changes”); Povenmire, supra note 50, at 97 (asserting that circumcision is “known to be
traumatic and painful for newborns . . . and results in a long-term heightened pain response”); see also
Updegrove, supra note 55, at 420 (noting that the long held belief that circumcision causes no pain for
the infant has been disproven).
66
Alanis & Lucidi, supra note 65, at 389 (noting that minor bleeding and local infection are the
most common complications of circumcision); Moses et al., supra note 65 at 371 (stating that
complications of circumcision include infections and bleeding). The rate of post-operative
complications for male circumcision is 0.2% to 0.6%. Id.; see also DOCTORS OPPOSING
CIRCUMCISION,
GENITAL
INTEGRITY
POL’Y
STATEMENT,
available
at
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67

penis; that it can have psychological and emotional effects, including
sexual dysfunction;68 and (though exceedingly rare) that it can result in
death.69
III. THE SAN FRANCISCO BALLOT MEASURE
In the months following the development of this project, the San
Francisco proposal was removed from the ballot by judicial order on an
unrelated issue of state law. San Francisco is preempted from legislating
in this area because the State of California already has a law regulating
circumcisions.70 Nonetheless, the constitutional question of whether a ban
would violate the Free Exercise Clause is still alive and will likely surface
again.71 For example, as the first iteration of this Note was being written,
the proponents of the San Francisco initiative planned to resubmit the
circumcision ban to Congress and state legislatures across the country.72
Also, somewhat beyond the scope of this Note, the mainstream media
reported in the summer of 2012 on the decision of a judge to outlaw infant
male circumcision, finding the procedure constitutes a form of bodily harm
and is subject to criminal penalties.73

http://www.doctorsopposingcircumcision.org/DOC/statement04.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2012)
[hereinafter DOCTORS OPPOSING CIRCUMCISION] (listing hemorrhage, infection, and surgical mishap as
immediate consequences of circumcision); The Facts Behind Circumcision, INTACT AM.,
http://www.intactamerica.org/learnmore (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (stating that circumcision causes
pain, infection, hemorrhage, and scarring).
67
See DOCTORS OPPOSING CIRCUMCISION, supra note 66 (noting that more serious complications
of circumcision include excision of part of the penis and amputation of the penis).
68
See Alanis & Lucidi, supra note 65, at 390 (stating that many circumcision opponents have
argued that removal of the foreskin causes sexual dysfunction); Moses et al., supra note 65, at 371
(noting anecdotal claims of physiological, emotional, and sexual adverse effects from male
circumcision).
69
Moses et al., supra note 65, at 371 (acknowledging that two deaths were reported from
circumcision in the United States over a twenty-five year period). But see DOCTORS OPPOSING
CIRCUMCISION, supra note 66 (citing a survey estimating 114 deaths in the United States annually
from “circumcision-related causes”).
70
See La Ganga, Judge Orders, supra note 8 (stating that San Francisco is preempted from
banning circumcisions by the California Business and Professions Code because only the state is
permitted to regulate medical procedures, and circumcision is a medical procedure).
71
The proposal in San Francisco followed a similar proposal in Massachusetts during its 2009–
2010 Session. Jessica Fargen, Plan to Ban Circumcision a Longshot, BOS. HERALD, Feb. 21, 2010, at
6. Additionally, MGM Bill is currently advocating for a federal and a state version of the male
circumcision ban. Greenberg, The Circumcision Wars, supra note 2; see also Congress and States
Prepare
for
Another
Circumcision
Battle,
MGMBILL.ORG
(Jan.
24,
2012),
http://mgmbill.org/pressrelease25.htm (noting efforts to outlaw circumcision nationally and in eleven
states).
72
2012
MGM
Bill
Submission
State
Office
Guidelines,
MGMBILL.ORG,
http://mgmbill.org/2012.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).
73
See, e.g., Benjamin Weinthal, German Court Declares Circumcision a Crime, JERUSALEM
POST, June 27, 2012, at 6.
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A. Chronology and Text of the San Francisco Ballot Measure
The San Francisco Ballot Measure was proposed by the organization
MGM Bill. MGM stands for “male genital mutilation.”74 The sponsors of
the proposal present the issue in extremely stark terms, often employing
hyperbole to frame the issue. A group affiliated with MGM Bill, Intact
America, explains on its website that circumcision “creates immediate
health risks and can lead to serious complications,” which include
“infection, hemorrhage, scarring, difficulty urinating, loss of part or all of
the penis, and even death.”75 They also compare the practice of male
circumcision to female circumcision,76 which they note is banned in the
United States,77 arguing that the female version of circumcision should not
be banned while the male version remains legal. Other critics of
circumcision resort to this false equation78 of male and female
circumcision.79
MGM Bill sees the issue as one of personal choice: If men want to be
circumcised they should be able to choose so. The San Francisco proposal
allowed men to be circumcised only after they reach age eighteen and
prevents parents from making this irreversible choice for their sons.
Matthew Hess, President of MGM Bill, said, “We’re not trying to stop
people from getting circumcised if they want to. We just want to protect

74
See A Bill to End Male Genital Mutilation in the U.S., MGMBILL.ORG,
http://mgmbill.org/index.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2012) (displaying headline referencing “Male Genital
Mutilation”).
75
The Facts Behind Circumcision, INTACT AM., http://www.intactamerica.org/learnmore
http://www.sfmgmbill.org/Site/Home.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
76
Frequently Asked Questions, MGMBILL.ORG, http://mgmbill.org/faq.htm (last visited Aug. 7,
2012) [hereinafter MGM Bill, Frequently Asked Questions] (“In the United States today, all forms of
child female circumcision are prohibited . . . . Males are not included in that legislation.”); Congress
and States Prepare for Another Circumcision Battle, supra note 71 (“The [Male Genital Mutilation
Bill] would protect boys from forced circumcision the same way that girls are protected under federal
and state laws.”); Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64 (“I
think circumcision of male children should be prohibited for the same reason that we prohibit female
genital cutting . . . . Every person—female and male—has the right to have their body left whole, and it
is the government’s duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves.”).
77
18 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly
circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris
of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both.”).
78
See infra Part V.B. for a discussion of the relative differences between male and female
circumcision.
79
See, e.g., Chessler, supra note 29, at 559 (“While concerns about female circumcision are at the
forefront of human rights law, male circumcision, amazingly, continues to be virtually ignored.
Although many activists and writers throughout the world condemn female circumcision, they fail to
acknowledge the similarity between male and female circumcision, and to consequently reconsider the
role of routine male circumcision in Western society.”).
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children from getting it forced on them.”
Lloyd Schofield, a retired
employee of the hotel industry and the leader of MGM’s efforts locally in
San Francisco, said, “The foreskin is there for a reason . . . . It’s not a birth
defect. It serves an important function in a man’s life, and nobody has a
right to perform unnecessary surgery on another human being.”81
If approved, the proposed ban would have made it “unlawful to
circumcise, excise, cut, or mutilate the whole or any part of the foreskin,
testicles, or penis of another person who has not attained the age of 18
years.”82 The penalty for violating this misdemeanor offense would have
included a fine not to exceed $1,000 and/or imprisonment.83 There would
have been a medical exception in circumstances where the operation was
performed due to “clear, compelling, and immediate medical need with no
less-destructive alternative treatment available.”84 But when construing the
medical exception, the proposal stated that “no account shall be taken of
the effect on the person on whom the operation is to be performed of any
belief on the part of that or any other person that the operation is required
as a matter of custom or ritual.”85
Opponents immediately challenged the proposal on grounds that it was
preempted by California state law, which “contains a ‘clear’ prohibition”
on these sorts of ballot measures.86 The court agreed that the California
Business and Professional Code, under which the state alone is empowered
to regulate medical procedures, expressly preempted the measure.87 It also
held that the ballot measure, if approved, would violate the Free Exercise
80

80
Heather Knight, Circumcision Isn’t an Only-in-S.F. Ballot Issue, S.F. CHRON., May 29, 2011,
at D1 [hereinafter Knight, Circumcision]; see also MGM Bill Frequently Asked Questions, supra note
76 (“Unless there is a compelling medical reason to do so, no one has the right to cut off the working
body part of a child.”); Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64
(“Every person—female and male—has the right to have their body left whole, and it is the
government’s duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves.”).
81
Conley, Circumcision Ban, supra note 7.
82
San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5001.
83
Id. § 5003.
84
Id. § 5002(a).
85
Id. § 5002(b). This Author asked Mr. Hess why a medical exemption was included, but not a
religious one. He responded:

This would have no teeth with a religious exemption because any parent could
simply check a box that says, ‘I wish to circumcise my son for religious reasons.’
Also, there is no religious exemption for female genital cutting and we feel that
males deserve the same protection under the law. However, we recognize that there
may be very rare instances where a circumcision must be performed for medical
reasons (for example, a child gets in a serious accident that requires the foreskin be
removed).
Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64.
86
Maria L. La Ganga, Foes Sue to Get Circumcision Ban Taken off S.F. Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June
23, 2011, at AA3.
87
La Ganga, Judge Orders, supra note 8.
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B. MGM Bill and Charges of Anti-Semitism
The proponents of the San Francisco proposal asserted that there was
no malice toward Judaism or Islam on their part in offering the proposed
ban.89 But some critics suggest an element of anti-Semitism, at least
among some proponents of the ban.90 As evidence, critics point to a comic
book series authored by Matthew Hess titled “Foreskin Man,”91 which
catalogs the adventures of an Inactivist superhero on an anti-circumcision
crusade.92 One such critic—the Anti-Defamation League—condemned the
comic book for its “grotesque anti-Semitic imagery and themes” and said
the comic was “disrespectful and deeply offensive.”93
Tapping into “classic stereotypes of Jews,”94 the comic book features
“a bearded, black-hatted Jew with an evil grin and a bloody blade”
(Monster Mohel) and “a blond, buff hero” (Foreskin Man) who fights the
evil Jewish Mohel.95 In the comic, Monster Mohel, holding a pair of
bloody scissors and flanked by two armed men, appears in clothing
traditionally worn by ultra-orthodox Jews.96 According to the comic,
Monster Mohel “likes nothing more than ‘cutting into the infantile penile
88

Id.
For example, in his email to the Author, Mr. Hess explained that, “[t]he common thread
running through the Foreskin Man series [discussed below] is that forced circumcision of children is
bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are bad.” Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG,
to Author, supra note 64.
90
Adam Cohen, San Francisco’s Circumcision Ban: An Attack on Religious Freedom?, TIME
(June 13, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077240,00.html (“Claims of
insensitivity, however, have recently turned into charges of outright anti-Semitism. One of the
referendum's key supporters has written a comic book, Foreskin Man, that portrays a blond, Aryanlooking superhero doing battle with ‘Monster Mohel.’”).
91
Mitchell Landsberg, Comic Book Stirs Outrage in Fight Over Circumcision, L.A. TIMES, June
4, 2011, at AA1 [hereinafter Landsberg, Comic Book]; Allison Vekshin, San Francisco Circumcision
Referendum Stirs Anti-Semitism Debate, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2011; 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-16/san-francisco-circumcision-ban-referendum-stirs-debateover-anti-semitism.html (quoting state Senator Mark Leno as referring to the comic strip’s images as
“blatantly anti-Semitic” and stating that the images are “literally pulled from Nazi literature”). The
comic strip is available at http://www.foreskinman.com.
92
Knight, Circumcision, supra note 80.
93
ADL Says Anti-Circumcision Comic Book Offends with ‘Grotesque’ Anti-Semitic Imagery,
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (June 3, 2011), http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASUS_12/6064_12.htm.
94
Will Kane, Cartoon Campaign Prompts Charges of Anti-Semitism, S.F. CHRON., June 7, 2011,
at A1 [hereinafter Kane, Cartoon Campaign] (quoting Fred Astren, Professor of Jewish studies at San
Francisco State University).
95
Landsberg, Comic Book, supra note 91. Mr. Hess has stated that the Foreskin Man character is
a caricature of himself. See Kane, Cartoon Campaign, supra note 94 (“Hess said he sees a bit of
himself in Foreskin Man, noting that they both are of German ancestry and have light-colored hair.”).
96
Landsberg, Comic Book, supra note 91. The men are depicted wearing black suits, white
button down dress shirts, and black hats.
89
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flesh of an 8-day-old boy.’”
The comic book states that “after the
glorified brit milah is complete, the delicious metzitzah b’peh provides the
icing on the cake.”98 “Metzitzah b’peh” refers to the practice of orally
suctioning the wound after removing the foreskin of the penis to clean the
wound.99
Hess denies that the cartoon or the proposal was targeted at Jewish
religious practices.100 In an email to this Author, he explained, “only one
issue [of the Foreskin Man series] dealt with Jewish circumcision. The
common thread running through the Foreskin Man series is that forced
circumcision of children is bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are
bad.”101
97

IV. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Thus far, this Note has considered the religious, cultural, and medical
dimensions of circumcision without detailing the religious liberty interests
at stake. We shall now turn to the voluminous jurisprudence interpreting
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
A. Early Cases Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause
1. Reynolds v. United States
In its first Free Exercise Clause case, the Supreme Court concluded in
Reynolds v. United States102 that polygamy practiced for religious reasons
was not protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.103
Convicted of violating a statute that outlawed bigamy in the Utah
Territory,104 George Reynolds argued that, as a member of the Mormon

97
Kane, Cartoon Campaign, supra note 94 (quoting Monster Mohel, MGMBILL.ORG,
http://www.foreskinman.com/images/monster-mohel-card-back.jpg (last visited Aug. 7, 2011)) (Hess
says he “has no grudge against Jews, only one against those, Jewish or not, who practice
circumcision”).
98
Monster Mohel, MGMBILL.ORG, http://www.foreskinman.com/images/monster-mohel-cardback.jpg (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).
99
Andy Newman, City Questions Circumcision Ritual After Baby Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2005, at B5. This procedure has been all but abandoned and only occurs in the most ultra-Orthodox
communities. Id.
100
See Kane, Cartoon Campaign, supra note 94 (stating that conveying an anti-Semitic message
in the Foreskin Man cartoon was “not the intention and not the point”).
101
Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64.
102
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
103
See id. at 164 (concluding that Congress could prohibit religiously-motivated polygamy in the
Utah Territory because the First Amendment protects only the right to hold religious beliefs and
opinions, and not the right actually to engage religious conduct). “Laws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices.” Id. at 166.
104
Id. at 146, 150–51. Under the statute:
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Church, it was his religious duty to practice plural marriage, and thus he
had a constitutional right to do so.105 Therefore, the statute could not
constitutionally be applied to him.
While acknowledging the religious obligation on the part of Mormons
to practice polygamy,106 the Court rejected Reynolds’s claim that under the
Free Exercise Clause, he actually had the right to engage in that conduct.107
Instead, the Court held that the First Amendment only denied Congress the
power to regulate religious belief (not action).108 Congress had the power
“to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order.”109 Thus, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause protects
only the freedom to believe; it does not include a contemporaneous right to
actually act upon that belief.110
The Court in Reynolds feared that allowing religious observers to
claim an exemption would lead to anarchy. The Court stated: “Can a man
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.”111 The Court’s decision, however, seems
based more on anti-Mormon animus pervasive at the time than on legal
principle. Specifically, the Court attacked polygamy as “odious among the
northern and western nations of Europe” and referred to the practice as
“almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and African people.”112

Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether
married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States have
exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.
Id. at 146. Although written as a law of general application, the statute was enacted specifically with
the purpose of eliminating religious polygamy, which had been legal under the territorial laws of Utah.
CATHERINE COOKSON, REGULATING RELIGION: THE COURTS AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 7
(2001).
105
COOKSON, supra note 104, at 193 n.4 (stating that for nineteenth century Mormons, plural
marriage was a religious obligation); PROTHERO, supra note 20, at 204 (listing polygamy as a religious
belief of Mormonism until 1890).
106
COOKSON, supra note 104, at 193 n.4.
107
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (Reynolds’s polygamy could constitutionally be criminalized
because, under the First Amendment, “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions”).
108
Id.
109
Id. The opinion quoted from Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association for
the proposition that “the legislative powers of the Government reach actions only and not opinions.” Id.
(emphasis added).
110
See id. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” (emphasis added)).
111
Id. at 166–67.
112
Id. at 164.
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2. Prince v. Massachusetts
In Prince v. Massachusetts,113 the Court upheld the criminal conviction
of Sarah Prince, a Jehovah’s Witness, who violated her state’s anti-child
labor law by allowing her nine-year old niece (over whom she had
guardianship)114 to sell the Church’s magazine on a public sidewalk.
Having been convicted, Prince argued the both her and her niece’s
conduct could not constitutionally be criminalized because evangelizing
and distributing the Watchtower magazine was a religious duty for
Jehovah’s Witness.115 The Court rejected this argument, concluding that
that the state’s power to regulate the activities of children was more
expansive than its authority over adults and that a state could
constitutionally prohibit (even religiously inspired) child labor.116 The
state has a vital interest in preventing harm to children, pursuant to the
parens patriae doctrine;117 as such, a state may subject religious conduct to
incidental regulation.118
In Prince, the Court recognized that the parental right to direct a
child’s religious upbringing is not without limits and may be subject to
reasonable regulation. The Court stated, “Parents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow [that] they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children . . . .”119 As applied here,
the state was within its regulatory authority to regulate a child’s preaching
on a public street.120 Opponents of circumcision have relied on this
“martyr” dictum to substantiate their claims that the procedure should not
113

321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 161.
115
Id. at 164.
114

The record in Prince showed that the girl considered herself a devout Jehovah’s
Witness and had ‘begged’ her aunt/guardian to allow her to help her distribute the
literature. . . . If the literature had been given away instead of offered for sale the law
would not have been applied.
COOKSON, supra note 104, at 26.
116
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168–69.
117
Id. at 166–67 (“[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.
Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent’s control by . . . regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor . . . . The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the
latter to ill health or death.”).
118
See id. at 168–69 (holding that legislation designed to regulate children’s public activities and
employment is within the state’s police power even when one’s “religious scruples dictate contrary
action”).
119
Id. at 170. It is curious why the Court used such explosive language (“martyr”) to describe the
conduct at issue in the case (selling magazines on a public street). See COOKSON, supra note 104, at 27
(“Note the strong language of ‘martyrdom’ used to describe the situation in this case, which, after all,
involved a nine-year-old girl and her aunt offering religious literature on a public street.”).
120
Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
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B. Sherbert, Yoder, and the Compelling Interest Test
Through this point, the Court’s cases have given great deference to
legislatures and have shown little regard for the religious liberty interests at
stake. In Sherbert v. Verner,122 and subsequently in Wisconsin v. Yoder,123
the Court’s free exercise cases turned toward granting some modicum of
protection to the religious liberty interests at stake with the development of
the compelling interest test.124
1. Sherbert v. Verner
In Sherbert, for the first time, the Court applied strict scrutiny125 to a
Free Exercise challenge placing upon the state the burden of demonstrating
that its action was justified by a “compelling state interest.”126
Adell Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was fired from her job as a
mill worker after refusing to work on Saturdays, her faith’s Sabbath. 127
The state denied her unemployment benefits because she had rejected other
work (which would have also required her to work on Saturday) without
what it considered to be good cause.128
Reversing the courts below, Justice Brennan held that denying
Sherbert unemployment compensation imposed an unjustifiable burden on
her religious liberty by forcing her to choose between her financial
livelihood and her faith.129 In so holding, the Court recognized that not
only direct, but also indirect burdens of government action could implicate
121
See, e.g., William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional
Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 347 (1984); Povenmire, supra note 50, at 104.
122
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
123
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
124
This general statement might be somewhat of an oversimplification of the Court’s free exercise
cases during this period. The result in Sherbert seems to conflict with a decision three years earlier,
Braunfeld v. Brown, where the Court upheld a city’s mandatory Sunday closing law, as applied to
Orthodox Jewish merchants. The law indirectly placed a burden on the merchant, an Orthodox Jew
who did not work on Saturday such that he could observe the Jewish Sabbath. He argued that closing
two days a week (one day for religious practice and one day by state compulsion) placed him at a
competitive disadvantage as compared to his competitors and would force him out of business.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961). Ruling against Braunfeld, Chief Justice Warren
concluded that the government’s goal of providing a uniform day of rest was paramount and could not
be compromised to accommodate Braunfeld and others similarly situated. Id. at 608–09.
125
Where strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review, “a law will be upheld if it is
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 554 & n.15 (4th ed. 2011).
126
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
127
Id. at 399 & n.1.
128
Id. at 399–401.
129
Id. at 410 (holding that “South Carolina may not Constitutionally apply the eligibility
provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest”).
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constitutional rights:
The [South Carolina Employment Security Commission’s]
ruling forces [Sherbert] to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship.130
Under Sherbert, to uphold a rule that imposes burdens on religious
practice, the state must show a compelling interest in promulgating the
regulations131 and demonstrate that these regulations are the least intrusive
means of achieving the state’s interest.132
The Sherbert Court rejected the state’s purported compelling interest—
fear of fraudulent claims or dilution of the fund by making payments to
claimants unable to find work on religious ground—as purely speculative
and unsubstantiated.133 Further, even if these concerns were legitimate, the
state failed to show that the problem could not be addressed in some other
way that did not infringe upon Sherbert’s rights under the First
Amendment.134
2. Wisconsin v. Yoder
Sherbert purported to establish strict scrutiny as the proper standard of
review for evaluating Free Exercise claims.135 However, the Court was
reluctant to invalidate laws on that basis.136 Aside from Sherbet, the only
other case during this period where strict scrutiny was used to vindicate
claims under the Free Exercise Clause was in the field of compulsory
school attendance laws as applied to Amish schoolchildren in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.137
Nine years after Sherbert, the Court considered whether Amish
students were entitled to a constitutional exemption from the state’s
compulsory school attendance law on religious grounds, and
concomitantly, whether their parents may be held criminally liable for
130
Id. at 404. The Court concluded that in construing the state’s interest, the burden on religious
rights is not determined solely by looking at the law’s intent; the effect or impact of the law on
religious conduct is also relevant. COOKSON, supra note 104, at 28.
131
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
132
Id. at 407.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
136
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 125, at 1297.
137
Id. The Court did apply strict scrutiny to strike down the ordinances at issue in Lukumi,
discussed infra at Part IV.C.2.
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failure to comply with the law. Under the unique circumstances in Yoder,
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibited Wisconsin from
compelling school attendance of Amish children after age sixteen.138
The plaintiffs in Yoder—parents of Amish school children—refused to
enroll their teenage children in school because they believed that exposure
to such “worldly influence” threatened the Amish values and way of life.139
Their objection was limited to enrollment of teenage students because it
was during that phase in life that Amish children learned self-reliance and
obtained the skills crucial to living a life as an Amish farmer or
housewife.140 In spite of these arguments, the parents were tried,
convicted, and fined $5 each.141
On appeal, the Supreme Court sided with the Amish parents, holding
that the state’s interest in compulsory school attendance (in this case) was
not sufficiently compelling to overcome the parents’ right to freely
exercise their religion.142 The decision turned on how compulsory
attendance infringed upon the rights of the Amish parents to steer the
religious upbringing of their children.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted, “the record in this
case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the
Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep
religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related
to daily living.”143 As applied, the compulsory school attendance law
would “gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of [the Amish
parents’] religious beliefs.”144 The Court recognized that the Amish
parents had a legitimate interest in keeping their teenage children sheltered
from cosmopolitan influences145 and that the interest advanced by the state
in educating children was not sufficiently compelling to justify inhibiting
138

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 at 234.
Id. at 210 (“Old Order Amish Communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief
that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and worldly
influence.”). The Amish parents objected to sending their children to high school because “the values
[higher education] teaches are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life; they
viewed secondary education as an impermissible exposure of their children to a ‘worldly’ influence in
conflict with their beliefs.” Id. at 210–11.
140
Id. at 211. The Amish did not challenge compulsory school attendance up to and through the
eighth grade, because they believed children must learn the basic skills taught in the early grades. Id. at
212.
141
Id. at 208.
142
Id. at 234. Note that in making its ruling, the Court considered the religious freedom of the
parents, not the children.
143
Id. at 216.
144
Id. at 219.
145
See id. at 218 (“[S]econdary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in
terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the
religious development of the . . . Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of
development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith . . . .”).
139
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146

their religious practice.
The Court rejected the State’s argument that under the parens partiae
doctrine, it had the power to act against the parents to advance the Amish
children’s best interest.147 The Court reasoned that allowing the state to
mandate two additional years of education for these Amish children would,
in essence, allow the state to dictate the children’s religious future.148 The
Court did cabin its expansive viewpoint on the reach of state power,
distinguishing the case from situations involving the exercise of the police
power, which would permit greater government regulation.149 The Court
explained that “the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise
claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child.”150 The Court
distinguished Yoder from Prince, noting that “[t]his case . . . is not one in
which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the
public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be
properly inferred.”151
C. The Modern Regime Under Smith and Lukumi
Today, free exercise questions are resolved under the Court’s decision
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, which was fleshed out by a subsequent decision Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.
1. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith
In Smith, the Court held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”152
Alfred Smith and Galen Black, both members of a Native American
Church, ingested peyote as part of a religious ceremony. 153 Both were
subsequently fired from their jobs as counselors at a drug treatment center
146
See id. at 222 (“It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the
eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as
the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as preparation of the child for
life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of Amish faith.”).
147
Id. at 229–30.
148
Id. at 232.
149
COOKSON, supra note 104, at 32.
150
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34.
151
Id. at 230. The question of physical harm to children is considered infra at Part V.B.
152
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
153
Id. at 874.
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and denied unemployment compensation by the State of Oregon because
their terminating offense (illegal drug use) constituted work-related
“misconduct.”154 In its challenge to the state’s denial of this benefit, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that Smith’s religious use of peyote fell within
the state’s prohibition, that state law did not include an exception for
sacramental usage, and that such prohibition did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause.155
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected Smith’s
argument (seemingly in line with Yoder) that the Free Exercise Clause
required a religious-conduct exemption from an otherwise valid state
law.156 Justice Scalia stated, “We have never held that an individual’s
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” 157 This statement by
the Court, of course, cannot be squared with the Court’s holding in Yoder.
Instead, the majority in Smith held that “the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”158 As
applied to Smith, the First Amendment did not mandate that he receive an
exemption from Oregon’s state law prohibiting the possession of peyote
for sacramental purposes.159
To the extent that the First Amendment requires exemptions from
neutral and generally applicable laws for religious conduct, Smith seems to
have eviscerated Yoder. However, rather than overrule Yoder and other
cases granting religious exemptions, the Court recharacterized those cases
as “hybrid situation[s]”160 in which a challenge under the Free Exercise
Clause is brought in conjunction with other constitutional protections.161
On this basis, the only claims the Court had sustained involved a free
exercise claim in connection with freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
or the right of parents to direct the education of their children.162 The
claim raised in Smith did not present a hybrid claim since it was

154

Id.
Id. at 876.
156
Id. at 878. Smith argued that his “religious motivation for using peyote” placed him “beyond
the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at [his] religious practice, and that is
concededly constitutional as applied to those who use drugs for other reasons.” Id.
157
Id. at 878–79.
158
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment)).
159
Id. at 890.
160
Id. at 882.
161
Id. at 881.
162
Id.
155
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2. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah
Two years after Smith, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
series of ordinances enacted by the City of Hialeah, Florida, that outlawed
the “sacrifice” of animals within the city.164 Sacrifice is a religious
practice of the Santeria religious.165 Shortly after the Santeria Church
announced plans to establish a house of worship in Hialeah, the City
Council adopted a series of ordinances that prohibited the ritual sacrifice of
animals.166 One ordinance “defined sacrifice as to unnecessarily kill,
torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption, and prohibited
owning or possessing an animal intending to use such animal for food
purposes.”167 However, the ordinance applied only against “any individual
or group that ‘kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual,
regardless of whether or not the flesh is to be consumed.’”168
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed
the rule in Smith: neutral and generally applicable laws need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest, even if the law has an
incidental effect on a particular religious practice.169 Lukumi fleshes out
Smith in two important ways. First, to avoid strict scrutiny, a law must be
both neutral and (not or) generally applicable.170 The Court distinguished
laws that are facially discriminatory from those which act as a “covert
suppression of particular religious beliefs.”171 The Free Exercise Clause
prohibits both facial discriminatory laws and “[o]fficial action that targets
religious conduct” but still meets the requirement of facial neutrality. 172
163
Id. at 882. As referenced above and discussed at considerable length below, see infra Part V,
there are two independent arguments for how the San Francisco proposal might be challenged on free
exercise grounds. The first is the substantive neutrality argument (namely that the formal neutrality
rule of Smith is inconsistent with the earlier jurisprudence and is insufficiently protective of religious
liberty). The second argument is that even under the rule in Smith, the proposal could not stand
because it represents both a parental rights/free exercise violation and/or a communicative activity/free
exercise violation.
164
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–28 (1993).
165
Animal sacrifice is a principal form of worship in the Santeria religion. Id. at 524 (“The basis
of the Santeria religion is the nurture of a personal relation with the orishas, and one of the principal
forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice.”).
166
Id. at 525–26 (discussing the Church’s announcement to plan construction in April 1987 and
the ordinances that were enacted beginning in June 1987).
167
Id. at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168
Id.
169
Id. at 531 (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879).
170
See id. (“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.”).
171
Id. at 534 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986)).
172
Id.
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“The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is
masked as well as overt.”173 (The laws at issue in Lukumi fell into the
second category.) Second, if a law fails to satisfy the requirements of
Smith because it is not both neutral and generally applicable, then it must
be justified by a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to advance that
interest to survive judicial review.174
As applied to the ordinances at issue in Lukumi, the Court concluded
that they were neither neutral nor generally applicable.175 The ordinances
were not neutral because their objective was to ban the Santeria religious
practice of animal sacrifice within the City of Hialeah.176 As evidence of
this intent, the Court looked to the language of the ordinances, which
prohibited “sacrifice” and “ritual.”177 Furthermore, the text of the
ordinances made evident that the only conduct subject to the ordinances
was the religious practice of Santeria.178 The Court reasoned that by
allowing some exceptions—for example, the slaughter of animals in
accordance with the Jewish custom of kosher—any veneer of neutrality
disappeared.179 The Court called the ordinances a “gerrymander,”
explaining how “careful drafting ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice
is prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all
other circumstances are unpunished.”180 In addition, the Court concluded
that the law was not generally applicable because it was under-inclusive:
only killings performed for the purpose of ritual sacrifice were prohibited
while copious other types of killings were either not prohibited or
expressly exempted from the reach of the ordinances.181
Having concluded that the law was neither neutral nor generally
applicable, the analysis turned to a Yoder-like strict scrutiny

173

Id.
Id. at 531–32; see also id. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not
of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”).
175
See id. at 524 (“The challenged laws had an impermissible object; and in all events the
principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws
were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.”).
176
Id. at 534 (stating that the object of the ordinances was the “suppression of the central element
of the Santeria worship service”).
177
Id. (finding that use of the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” constitutes evidence of discriminatory
intent).
178
Id. at 535.
179
See id. at 536 (“The definition excludes almost all killings of animals except for religious
sacrifice, and the primary purpose requirement narrows the proscribed category even further, in
particular by exempting kosher slaughter. . . . It suffices to recite this feature of the law as support for
our conclusion that Santeria alone was the exclusive legislative concern.” (citations omitted)).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 543–45 (giving examples of legal and exempted killings of animals, inter alia, fishing,
mice and rat extermination, and euthanasia of stray animals).
174
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182

examination.
Under the compelling interest test, the ordinances were
unconstitutional because they were not sufficiently narrowly tailored: the
city could have achieved its purported objective, the safe and sanitary
disposal of animal remains, without targeting Santeria.183 Also, the Court
reasoned that given the under-inclusiveness of the ordinances—written to
apply only to a small subset of conduct, specifically that having to do with
a religious motive—the interests asserted by the government could not be
all that compelling.184
V. THE SAN FRANCISCO BALLOT MEASURE, THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE,
AND SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY
The case law outlined in the previous section sets forth the analytical
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the San Francisco
proposal. Whether or not the proposal is constitutional turns on how
neutrality is defined and applied by the Court. In applying the neutrality
requirement, this Note argues that the Court should adopt the definition
articulated by one scholar: substantive neutrality.
A. General Applicability and Neutrality
Under the present rule, the Court would only need to find that the San
Francisco proposal is of general application and formally (and/or
objectively) neutral to survive constitutional scrutiny. This section argues
that this standard is an insufficient protector of our religious liberty, and
therefore should be abandoned in favor of a rule that more properly
accommodates religious practices.
1. General Applicability
Unlike the ordinances at issue in Lukumi,185 the San Francisco Ballot
Measure is a law of general application because it does not target a
religious group. The conduct regulated by the proposal differs from other
conduct examined earlier in this Note—bans on ritual sacrifice or
polygamy—because circumcision is a majoritarian conduct practiced by a
182
See id. at 546 (requiring that a law that is not neutral or generally applicable “must undergo the
most rigorous of scrutiny,” meaning that such a law “must advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and
must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests” (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628
(1978), quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 546–47.
185
The four ordinances in Lukumi were not generally applicable because they failed to prohibit
the same non-religious conduct that was implicated by the Santeria sacrifice of animals: protecting
public health and preventing animal cruelty. Id. at 543. Similarly, the ordinance exempted the
commercial slaughter of small numbers of hogs and/or cattle, while prohibiting analogous religious
conduct. Id. at 545.
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186

large segment of the population.
As mentioned previously, it has been
estimated that only 10% of circumcisions in the United States are
performed for religious purposes.187 Given the ubiquity of circumcision in
the United States, the proposed ban does not attempt to regulate a conduct
only engaged in by a small religious minority.188 To the contrary, the
proposal is written extremely broadly and specifically excludes religion as
a valid reason for granting an exemption.189 Therefore, it is generally
applicable vis-à-vis religion. Whether it is neutral is a separate inquiry
entirely.
One reason that the Court in Lukumi ruled those ordinances were not
generally applicable was because of their under-inclusiveness (the
ordinances were written to exclude many types of animal killings and
exempted many others, such that the only forms of animal killing that were
prohibited, effectively, were those engaged in for religious motivations).
By way of contrast, the San Francisco proposal contains only a single
exemption: circumcisions may be performed on males under age eighteen
only when medically necessary.190 It could be argued, based on Lukumi,
that this exemption makes the law under-inclusive because exempting
circumcision for one reason undermines the purpose of the entire
legislative project.191 But this type of exemption is different from the
exemptions the Court found constitutionally impermissible in Lukumi. It
does not appear that the drafters included this exemption so that the law
would apply only to a narrow subset of circumcisions (as the drafter of the
Lukumi ordinances intended that proposal to apply only to Santeria
sacrifice). Rather, the San Francisco proposal is written to apply as widely
as possible.192 The proposal includes a single, narrowly written exception
186
As discussed above, circumcision is the most widely performed surgical procedure among
newborn males in the United States and approximately eighty percent of men in the United States have
been circumcised. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
187
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
188
If the proposal did attempt to regulate conduct that was only engaged in by a religious
minority, then it would be constitutionally suspect. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[A] State would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ if it
sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only
because of the religious belief that they display.”).
189
See San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5002(a) (medical exemption to San
Francisco Ballot Measure).
190
See id. (“A surgical operation is not a violation of this section if the operation is necessary to
the physical health of the person on whom it is performed because of a clear, compelling, and
immediate medical need with no less-destructive alternative treatment available, and is performed by a
person licensed in the place of its performance as a medical practitioner.”).
191
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (“All
laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has
the incidental effect of burdening religious practice.”).
192
For example, the medical exemption in the San Francisco proposal is followed by a subsection
stating that, “[i]n applying subsection (a), no account shall be taken of the effect on the person on
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for occasions when circumcision is deemed medically necessary. The
purpose of this medical exception is consistent with the broad purpose of
the proposal, namely protecting the health, safety, and bodily integrity of
the child.193
The law might also be challenged as under-inclusive because it applies
only to circumcisions performed on persons under eighteen; adult men
would be free to undergo circumcision at will. However, allowing
circumcisions to be performed on adults, but not minors, does not
compromise the legislative purpose. The sponsors of the proposal see
circumcision as a matter of personal choice.194 Thus, permitting adult men
to be circumcised, but not infant boys, would be consistent with the
legislative intent of the proposal. Further, since most circumcisions
(religious and secular) are performed on boys in their infancy,195 this would
not create an opening to argue that the text is drafted to target only
religious circumcisions (which, at least in the case of Judaism, mandate
circumcision be performed on the child’s eighth day of life).
2. Neutrality
In addition to being generally applicable, to avoid a strict scrutiny
analysis, a law must also be neutral.196 Whether a law is neutral, however,
turns on how neutrality is defined. It is on this prong that this Note argues
that the San Francisco proposal is most ripe for review and it is here where
the flaws of the Court’s present doctrine become apparent. Given the
opportunity, the Court should jettison its present definition of neutrality
and adopt substantive neutrality as the correct understanding of neutrality.

whom the operation is to be performed of any belief on the part of that or any other person that the
operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual.” San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, §
5002(b).
193
But see Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and Religious
Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 361 (2010) (“How many secular exceptions do there need to be
before a religious claim under the Free Exercise Clause becomes possible?”). Lund refers to this as the
“‘multiple secular baseline’ problem.” Id. Under the Equal Liberty theory, a secular medical
exemption would potentially open the door to a religious one. See id. at 362 (criticizing Equal Liberty
analysis when applied to free exercise questions and writing that the analysis devolves “into the same
general applicability inquiry it seeks to replace”). Still, even the Equal Liberty critique falls short
where, as here, there is only a single exception. Thus, the multiple secular exceptions of the problems
identified in Lukumi are not present.
194
Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64 (“We support
every man’s right to undergo circumcision for any reason if he chooses to do so. All we are saying is
that it shouldn’t be forced on him.”).
195
See Merrill, Statistical Brief #45, supra note 43 (stating that the majority of circumcisions in
the United States are performed on newborn babies).
196
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531 (“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . .
failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not be satisfied.”).
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a. Facial (Formal) Neutrality
In Smith, Justice Scalia defined neutrality to mean nothing more than
facial neutrality: “[A] state would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]’ if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that
they display.”197 An example given by the Court of a law that would not
be facially neutral was one that banned statues used for religious purposes
because it created a religious category (“worship purposes”) and singled
out that category for disparate treatment. 198 (Apparently, under the Court’s
myopic viewpoint, a law banning all statutes would not violate the Free
Exercise Clause, even though many religions practice idolatry.)
What the Court refers to as facial neutrality, Douglas Laycock terms
“formal neutrality.” By his terminology, “[a] law is formally neutral if it
does not use religion as a category—if religious and secular examples of
the same phenomenon are treated exactly the same.”199 Formal neutrality
sees neutrality as a proxy for equality, and requires simply that religious
and non-religious occurrences of the same phenomena be treated
identically, without considering the reasons behind the conduct (or the
effect a perfectly well-intentioned law has on religious practice). 200 Under
a formal neutrality regime, religious exemptions would be unconstitutional
because they create a religious classification.201
If formal neutrality is the ultimate test of the neutrality standard, 202
then the San Francisco proposal is constitutional even if there is no
compelling state interest for the circumcision ban. The proposal does not
create any religious categories. Rather, it criminalizes the circumcision of
197
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. I); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to laws that by their terms
impose disabilities on the basis of religion . . . .”); Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited,
110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 57 & n.30 (2007) [hereinafter Laycock, Revisited] (citing Smith for the
proposition that the Court equates neutrality with formal neutrality).
198
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78.
199
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 54.
200
See Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 999 (noting that formal neutrality “is closely akin to
the equal treatment and equal opportunity side of the affirmative action dentate”); see also Laycock,
Revisited, supra note 197, at 55 (noting that formal neutrality requires neutral categories, whereas
substantive neutrality demands neutral incentives).
201
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000. For example, under Prohibition, the exception for
sacramental wine would have been unconstitutional under a formal neutrality regime, as it would have
treated religious and non-religious occurrences of the same conduct differently. Id.
202
For a discussion of why formal neutrality is an insufficient standard, see Alan Brownstein,
Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55, 56 (2006) (Critics of Smith argue
that “[b]y limiting judicial review to only those situations in which the government discriminates
against religious beliefs or practices, and refusing to protect religious activities against substantial
burdens imposed by neutral and general laws, the Court was not taking religious liberty seriously.”);
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 999–1001 (critiquing formal neutrality).
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any person under age eighteen (save those performed pursuant to the
narrow medical exemption).203 By contrast, if the law had banned “brit
milah,” or “circumcisions performed for religious purposes,” under Smith
and Lukumi it would not be neutral and thus not upheld. But under a test
that examines only the categories—as Justice Scalia set down in Smith—
the San Francisco proposal would be neutral (and since I have already
concluded that it is generally applicable, the Court would uphold it without
even needing to perform the strict scrutiny analysis). Upholding the
proposal on this basis—despite the fact that it would prevent a long held
religious tradition from being performed—“could not be reconciled with
any concept of religious liberty worthy of the name.” 204 Surely the
Constitution requires more than this pyrrhic notion of equality.
b. Object Neutrality
The decision in Lukumi suggests that the Constitution requires more
than simple formal neutrality: It also requires what shall hereinafter be
referred to as object neutrality. The Court explained: “[I]f the object of a
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices [engaged in] because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral . . . .”205 The ordinances in
Lukumi were struck down on this basis because the object of the legislation
was the “suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship
service”206—referring to animal sacrifice.
Even proponents of the San Francisco proposal would concede that
their goal was to ban the practice of circumcision in the city, whether
engaged in for religious or secular reasons.207 The more complicated
matter is determining whether the proponents’ objective was to target the
religious behavior, as such, or if that was merely an incidental effect of a
broader legislative project.
Proving another person’s objective is difficult and speculative at best.
The strongest evidence of anti-Semitism as a motivating factor for the San
Francisco proposal is the Foreskin Man cartoon featuring “Monster
Mohel.”208 Religious circumcisions constitute a tiny minority (less than
ten percent) of the circumcisions performed in the United States.209 Thus,
it is curious why Hess chose to focus the comic strip on Jewish
203

San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5001.
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000.
205
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1992).
206
Id. at 534.
207
Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64 (stating that
the most common argument against the proposal is that it “would violate parents’ freedom of religion”
but “parents aren’t legally allowed to cut off other healthy body parts from their children, so why
should we make an exception for the foreskin?”).
208
See supra Part III.B (discussing anti-Semitism in the comic book series titled “Foreskin Man”).
209
Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
204
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circumcisions and demonize the ritual and those who perform it.
The
portrayal of Jewish circumcision in these comics is misleading and, thus,
suspicious. Also, by its terms, the proposal explicitly forbids any
accommodation for circumcision performed as a religious rite when
applying the health exception.211 But since religious circumcisions make
up such a small percentage of the procedures performed in the United
States, why was it necessary to bar a religious exemption? The proposal
did not single out circumcisions performed for cultural purposes, but, as
has been shown above, many more circumcisions are performed for
cultural rather than religious purposes. Since so few people could take
advantage of the religious exemption, the law could accommodate the
religious practice (by exempting religious circumcisions) without
sacrificing its legitimate secular objective.212
The proponents of the San Francisco proposal deny anti-Semitism was
a motivating factor behind the proposal. They claim their objective was
simply to protect all children from forced circumcision, not to target
Jewish or Muslim religious practices, as such.213 And it must be
acknowledged that, given the ubiquity of the procedure in the United States
and the small number of religious circumcisions performed, the motivation
was not likely an attack on Jews and Muslims.214 For these reasons, it
would be difficult to sustain an argument that the law is not neutral by
virtue of some impermissible object.215
c. Substantive Neutrality
Does the Free Exercise Clause—and the values it sought to codify and
210
Hess defends that only one issue of the Foreskin Man comic book focused on Jewish
circumcision. He wrote to the Author that “[t]he common thread running through the Foreskin Man
series is that forced circumcision of children is bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are bad.” Email
from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64.
211
San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5002(b).
212
Hess claims that a religious exemption could not have been included because the proposal
“would have no teeth with a religious exemption because any parent could simply check a box that says
‘I wish to circumcise my son for religious reasons.’” Email from Matthew Hess to Author, supra note
64. Notice that Hess does not argue that circumcision is so harmful that a religious exemption could
never be justified, but instead raises a concern about how an exemption might be implemented.
213
See id. (“The common thread running through the Foreskin Man series is that forced
circumcision of children is bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are bad.”).
214
The San Francisco Ballot Measure is more like the law at issue in Smith (a general criminal
prohibition having an incidental effect on religious observers) than the ordinances struck down in
Lukumi (an ordinance written with the objective of outlawing conduct performed only by a minority
religion, which excluded or exempted similar conduct performed for secular reasons). See supra notes
158–159, 177–181and accompanying text.
215
See Eugene Volokh, Proposed San Francisco Circumcision Ban, and Religious Freedom,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 23, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/05/23/proposed-sanfrancisco-circumcision-ban-and-religious-freedom/ (stating that courts require strong evidence to set
aside a law that is neutral on its face vis-à-vis religion).
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protect—require simply facial (and/or object) neutrality, or does it also
require something more? A third way of understanding the neutrality
requirement, the way this Notes advocates, is that the First Amendment
requires that laws also be substantively neutral.
Substantive neutrality is concerned with the incentives (and
disincentives) created by law vis-à-vis religious conduct.216 Laycock
believed that “substantive neutrality insists on minimizing government
influence on religion.”217 A law is substantively neutral to the extent that it
does not encourage nor discourage religious conduct or belief.218 Laycock
elegantly writes that substantive neutrality means that:
Government should not interfere with our beliefs about
religion either by coercion or by persuasion. Religion may
flourish or wither; it may change or stay the same. What
happens to religion is up to the people acting severally and
voluntarily; it is not up to the people acting collectively
through government.219
Laycock offers the following example to explain the difference
between a law that is formally neutral and one that is substantively neutral.
A statute that states that “[c]hildren cannot consume alcoholic beverages in
any amount for any purpose” is formally neutral because religion is not a
category under the law and alcohol is forbidden to be consumed by all
children, whether for a religious purpose or otherwise.220 The law,
however, is not substantively neutral because by (implicitly) forbidding
children from taking communion, it discourages adherents from engaging
in an act essential to the Catholic worship service.221
An exemption to the hypothetical law described above would be
substantively neutral because it is unlikely that this accommodation would
incentivize anyone to engage in a religious act unless he was inclined to do
216
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 65 (writing that substantive neutrality is about
“[n]eutral incentives, neither encouraging nor discouraging religion” and stating that this theory offers
“a coherent conception of neutrality that is consistent . . . with regulatory exemptions for religious
behavior”).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 54–55; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1146–47 (1990) (advocating for incentive neutrality, whereby “free
exercise exemptions [are given] to ensure that incentives to practice a religion are not adversely
affected by government action”).
219
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1002.
220
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 55. For much the same reasons, the San Francisco
proposal is formally neutral.
221
See id. (explaining that “[f]orbidding children to take communion wine, or criminally
punishing their parents and the priest who gives them the sacrament, powerfully discourages an act of
worship”). That is why, during Prohibition, the National Prohibition Act, which forbade the sale or
consumption of alcoholic beverages in the United States, exempted the use of sacramental wine.
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000.
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so anyway. Few people are likely to convert to Catholicism or even attend
Catholic Church services more regularly because their children would get
to taste (literally) a sip of wine––the exception being those who already
desired to do so, until being deterred by the government’s prohibition.222
Thus, the hypothetical law is not substantively neutral, but an exemption to
it is, because the latter does not change anyone’s incentives; it does not
create an impetus for religious conduct that did not already exist, whereas
the former creates a significant disincentive for engaging in the religious
activity.223 But it must be conceded that, to the extent that an exemption
incentivizes religious conduct, the motive for which did not already exist,
there would be a potential claim under the Establishment Clause.
Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lukumi vigorously argues for
substantive neutrality.224 Like Laycock, Justice Souter argues that
neutrality means more than simply the absence of government hostility
toward a particular religious group.225 Rather, the Free Exercise Clause
requires not just formal neutrality, but also substantive neutrality. As
Justice Souter wrote, “A law that is religion neutral on its face or in its
purpose may lack neutrality in its effect by forbidding something that
religion requires or requiring something that religion forbids.”226 After
reviewing recent scholarship on the history and original meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause,227 Justice Souter concludes:
There appears to be a strong argument from the Clause’s
development in the First Congress, from its origins in the
post-Revolution state constitutions and pre-Revolution
colonial charters, and from the philosophy of rights to which
the Framers adhered, that the Clause was originally
understood to preserve a right to engage in activities
222
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 55. Without the exemption, it would have been a crime
to take Communion or conduct a traditional Passover Seder during Prohibition. Laycock, Formal,
supra note 17, at 1000.
223
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 55.
224
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Smith embraced substantive neutrality as well. She would
have denied the claimant’s unemployment compensation because she believed that the State’s interest
in uniform application of its drug control laws was sufficiently compelling to infringe upon religious
liberty. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903–06 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying the compelling interest test to affirm the
appellants’ convictions under Oregon state law).
225
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 565 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (writing that “[o]ur cases have established
that ‘[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the
observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental
interest justifies the burden’”(quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493
U.S. 378, 384–85 (1990))).
226
Id. at 561.
227
See id. 574–76 (stating that “recent scholarship rais[es] serious questions about the Smith
rule’s consonance with the original understanding and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause”).
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necessary to fulfill one’s duty to one’s God, unless those
activities threatened the rights of others or the serious needs
of the State.228
Accordingly, Justice Souter would hold that the neutrality needed to
implement the purpose of the Framers “be the substantive neutrality of our
pre-Smith cases, not the formal neutrality sufficient for constitutionality
under Smith.”229
Under a substantive neutrality rule, the San Francisco proposal would
not be upheld to the extent it applied to religious practice (absent a
compelling state interest) because it disincentivizes religious adherents
from engaging in their religion’s prescribed conduct. Substantive
neutrality requires neutral incentives, and to the extent that it criminalizes
circumcision and imposes monetary penalties and incarceration on those
who perform that act, the law creates an impermissible disincentive from
engaging in religious conduct.230 Unlike an object neutrality regime, where
the intent of the law (or its sponsors) matters, substantive neutrality does
not care about intentions, only incentives.
An exemption to the San Francisco proposal for religious adherents
(and only for these people) is substantively neutral and thus in keeping
with the objectives of the Free Exercise Clause.231 It is unlikely that the
exemption would encourage non-adherents to convert to Judaism or Islam
solely for the purpose of circumcising their sons in San Francisco. Very
few people would be so incentivized by the exemption that they would
convert religions to take advantage of this minor accommodation.232 Thus,
the exemption is substantively neutral because it is unlikely to change
anyone’s incentives to pursue circumcision, but criminalizing the religious
conduct would disincentivize the religious activity. But, to the extent that
the exemption would encourage people to join the Jewish or Islamic
faiths—or to participate in these faiths’ practices to a greater degree, for
those already members—that would be a basis for denying the exemption

228

Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 576.
230
If enacted, the proposal’s likely consequence would be that religious circumcisions would
continue unabated, with families simply travelling outside of San Francisco to have the ritual
performed on their sons. Instances of non-religious circumcisions, which primarily occur in the
hospital, however, would likely decrease as parents, sans religious motivation, are less likely to find
alternative accommodations.
231
An exemption for only religious adherents might offend the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”), but that issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
232
This is especially true as applied to the San Francisco proposal. Those not qualifying for the
exemption could simply go to somewhere else to have the circumcision performed. Conceivably, if a
national ban was imposed, the argument that the exemption is substantively neutral is weaker.
229
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233

as creating an establishment of religion.
There is a legitimate fear that some people would lie about (or
exaggerate the extent of) their religious affiliation to exploit the exemption
given to religious adherents. This fear is compounded by the fact that the
Court will not inquire into the veracity of a religious adherent’s claim. 234
While a certain amount of dishonest behavior is inevitable, for many
people, religion is a deeply personal and private matter, such that few are
likely to feign religious belief to take advantage of this minor
accommodation.235 Further, even if there were more than a few spurious
religious exemption claims, would that be a sufficient reason for denying
those true religious observers some accommodation? Surely the existence
of a right under the Free Exercise Clause does not depend on the potential
for skullduggery by a determined few. Just as Blackstone understood that
it was better that ten guilty go free than one innocent be convicted,236 it is
preferable that a few illegitimate exemptions be granted than deny those
true followers the right to practice their religious obligations.
As the reviews by Laycock237 and others238 make clear, prior to Smith,
the Court embraced a substantive neutrality approach––both in its Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause cases. In Everson v. Board of
Education,239 the Court explained “[n]either [a state nor the federal
government] can force [or] influence a person to go or to remain away
from church against his will.”240 In Sherbert, the Court taught that a
religious exemption “reflects nothing more than the governmental
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.”241 This
reasoning is a clear embrace of substantive neutrality—recall that an
exemption creates a religious category and thus violates the formal

233
See Lund, supra note 193, at 377 (analogizing from Smith about the effect exemptions have
on non-observers). Lund writes that “[t]o the extent that letting the Native American Church use
peyote incentivizes other to join the Church, we have a reason to deny the exemption or extend it to
deep rooted claims of secular conscience.” Id.
234
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (1990) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those
creeds.” (quoting Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))).
235
This is especially true in the case of the San Francisco proposal, as the determined secularist
could simply go one town over and have his son circumcised at any hospital or doctor’s office.
236
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (“[T]he law holds, that it is better that ten
guilty persons e[s]cape, than that one innocent [s]uffer.”).
237
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 57–59 (reviewing and analyzing cases under the
religion clauses of the First Amendment).
238
See, e.g., Lund, supra note 193, at 354 (stating that prior to Smith, the Court embraced a
substantive neutrality approach).
239
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
240
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 57 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 15).
241
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963); see Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 57–
58 (quoting passages from Sherbert and Yoder to show the Court’s embrace of substantive neutrality).
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242

neutrality rule; thus, when the Court speaks of neutrality it must think of
it in the substantive sense. Similarly, in Yoder, the Court held that “[a]
regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.”243
A “friendly” separation of church and state requires substantive
neutrality. In leaving religion as a matter of private choice, substantive
neutrality provides the greatest amount of religious liberty possible under
the Constitution. Commenting on Smith, one author wrote that the Court
“reduc[ed] the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, in large measure, to
an equality right as opposed to a liberty right.”244 If this is so—if the Free
Exercise Clause mandates simply equality in terms—then the Clause is
rendered superfluous, since other provisions of the Constitution provide for
equality, specifically the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.245 Therefore, if religious liberty is to remain a fundamental
value in our democracy, then the constitutional protection of the Free
Exercise Clause should not end at the absence of hostility. It must also
include the freedom from incidental (perhaps inadvertent, but nonetheless
oppressive) governmental restraints on religious conduct.
Substantive neutrality is a means of preserving religious liberty, which
is a concept beyond religious equality. The idea embraces religious
freedom by minimizing government influence over religion,246 thus leaving
it as a matter of private and personal choice to the greatest extent practical.
Formal neutrality is a necessary condition for religious liberty, but at times
it can be insufficient. To quote Laycock, “If the free exercise of religion
includes anything beyond bare belief, it must be the right to perform the
sacred rituals of the faith.”247
Laycock’s formulation might be cabined to recognize that there are
times when a compelling governmental interest justifies the infringement
on religious liberty. This Note does not argue that all religious conduct is
beyond government regulation; regulations infringing on religious practice,
however, must be justified under the strict scrutiny construct the Court uses
when government regulation infringes on the exercise of fundamental
242
See Laycock, supra note 17, at 1000 (arguing that the religious exemption to Prohibition was
unconstitutional under a formal neutrality rule).
243
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (emphasis added); see Laycock, Revisited,
supra note 197, at 58 (discussing Yoder and substantive neutrality).
244
Daniel D. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking Foundations of
American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2011).
245
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
246
Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 65; see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524
(1986) (“A critical function of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of
members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss
minority beliefs as unimportant, because unfamiliar.”).
247
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000.
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rights. For example, fundamentalists in Mali recently cut off the hand of a
man accused of larceny in accordance with their religious beliefs.248
Obviously there is some conduct—stoning and human sacrifice, for
example—that a modern society cannot allow regardless of religious
beliefs. The rule the Court used prior to Smith dealt with this problem
through the compelling interest test; Smith does away with this
accommodating standard.
The position that religious observers are entitled to some relief from
generally applicable laws having an incidental effect on their religious
practice is not without detractors. Typical is the argument advanced by
legal scholar Abbie Chessler, who suggests that just because “circumcision
is a tenet of certain religions is not a reason to provide an exemption from
a generally applicable criminal law.”249
Chessler is correct to conclude that under the Smith rule, prohibition of
circumcision would be upheld, even against those who justify it on
religious grounds;250 even so, her lack of concern for the liberty interests at
stake is disconcerting. Furthermore, her analysis of the underlying legal
principles is spurious. Quoting from Smith, Chessler writes that the Court
has never held that religious belief is a valid excuse from any otherwise
valid and generally applicable law.251 But, of course this is not true, as
Yoder held that religious beliefs could relieve one from his obligation to
follow a law pursuant to the to the compelling interest test.252 Moreover,
Chessler recites this text from Minersville School District v. Gobitis253:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious belief. The mere possession of
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns
of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities.254
248

Adam Nossiter, Islamists in North Mali Amputate Man’s Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at

A4.
249

Chessler, supra note 29, at 601.
Id. at 599. Povenmire also recites that a ban on circumcision would be upheld—even without
a compelling government interest—provided it is neutral and generally applicable. Povenmire, supra
note 50, at 117.
251
Chessler, supra note 29, at 599 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)).
252
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment prevented
Wisconsin from enforcing that compulsory school attendance law against the Amish parents); see
McConnell, supra note 218, at 1120 (citing Yoder for the proposition that religious beliefs have been
used to excuse compliance from a generally applicable law).
253
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
254
Id. at 594–95.
250
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It is curious why Chessler and Justice Scalia in Smith rely so heavily
on this case, given that Gobitis was overturned three years later in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,256 with that Court stating
that some rights are beyond the whims of the political process, included
among them “freedom of worship.”257 As one scholar criticized, “Relying
on Gobitis without mentioning Barnette is like relying on Plessy v.
Ferguson without mentioning Brown v. Board of Education.”258
In addition to being unnecessary after Smith, it has also been argued
that religious exemptions are inappropriate because they amount to
favoritism for religious people over nonreligious people. This is the Equal
Liberty theory.259 But exemptions can be reconciled with any supposed
favoritism to religious conduct depending on where one sets the baseline
for determining incentives.260 Taking the proposal in San Francisco as our
example, if the baseline is the present state of the law: any child may be
circumcised for religious and non-religious purposes, and a law is
subsequently enacted prohibiting circumcisions, the religious liberty of
those who practice circumcisions has decreased; their conduct has been
disincentivized. However, people who do not practice circumcision as a
religious obligation have not lost any religious liberty relevant to the
present discussion. Thus, the Equal Liberty critique falls short because an
exemption for religious observers restores their liberty interest to absolute
zero, putting them at the same level as the non-religious person.
Relatedly, there is an argument that a religious exemption would
violate the Establishment Clause by advancing religious interests in some
way. To the extent that an exemption does violate the Establishment
Clause by privileging religious adherents, the response given by
substantive neutrality is simply that:
Government does not establish a religion by leaving it alone;
255
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79 (citing Gobitis for the proposition that the Court has “never held
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,” and referring to Gobitis as a case from the Court’s
“free exercise jurisprudence”).
256
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
257
Id. at 638 (stating that a purpose of the Bill of Rights was to place certain rights, including
freedom of speech and freedom to worship beyond the reach of momentary political majorities); see
McConnell, supra note 218, at 1124 (stating that the Court fails to mention that Gobitis was overturned
by Barnette).
258
McConnell, supra note 218, at 1124 (footnotes omitted).
259
Lund, supra note 193, at 356 (“Equal Liberty’s core claim [is] in the absence of things like
hostility, neglect, or indifference, religious exemptions are constitutionally inappropriate because they
essentially amount to favoritism for religious groups and individuals.”); see also Laycock, Revisited,
supra note 197, at 80–81 (discussing Stephen Gey’s theory that any accommodation for religious
conduct violates the Establishment Clause).
260
See Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1005 (“[S]ubstantive neutrality requires a baseline
from which to measure encouragement and discouragement.”).
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government does not benefit religion by first imposing a
burden through regulation and then lifting that burden
through exemption, and, in most cases, such exemptions do
not encourage anyone to engage in a religious practice unless
he was already independently motivated to engage in the
practice.261
An exemption does not favor a religion by simply lifting an underlying
regulation that is burdensome to the religious faithful. Professor Laycock
notes that the Court has rejected on numerous occasions the argument that
exemptions violate the Establishment Clause.262
As applied to the subject of this Note—the proposed circumcision ban
in San Francisco—the argument is that there is no establishment of religion
where an exemption is carved out to restore religious adherents to the
position they enjoyed before government stepped in and burdened their
religious conduct in the first place. Thus, an exemption for Jews and
Muslims to the San Francisco proposal would not privilege them; it would
merely restore them to the status quo ante. Exemptions do not create an
establishment of religion because no exemption would be needed had the
government not intervened in the first place by burdening the religion
through its regulatory powers.
If the Free Exercise Clause means anything, surely it means that
government cannot impose a Hobson’s choice on religious adherents:
abandon your centuries-old religious tradition or continue to practice that
tradition but subject yourself to criminal sanctions. Smith’s formal
neutrality requirement and Lukumi’s object neutrality requirement are
insufficient protectors of religious liberty. Something more is needed to
ensure that government does not have the unintended consequence of
limiting religious practice. That “something” is substantive neutrality.
Evaluating laws by the incentives they create—rather than only by the
categories they establish or the goal of the legislation—offers the greatest
level of religious freedom possible.
It is illuminating to consider how the results of several cases
previously discussed in this Note might differ under a substantive
neutrality regime. Since the Court applied something akin to substantive
neutrality in Sherbert and Yoder (without actually calling it that), the
261
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemptions Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 139, 153–
54 (2009).
262
Id. at 154 n.53 (citing a list of cases where the Supreme Court rejected the argument); see also
Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the
Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2006) (“There is no significant originalist
support for the core idea that exempting religion from regulation establishes religion . . . . I have found
no one in the eighteenth century who attacked them as an establishment of religion or denied that
legislatures had power to enact them.”).

734

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:695

results in those two cases would not change under the rule advocated for in
this Note.
If the Court continued along the Sherbert/Yoder line in Smith, the
result might have differed. The State of Oregon imposed a (facially)
neutral and generally applicable law banning the possession of peyote.
Two Native Americans who ingested peyote as part of a religious
ceremony263 challenged that law as applied to them.264
Under a substantive neutrality regime, the law would have been upheld
in the aggregate, but an exemption might have been carved out for people
(such as the appellants) who possessed peyote for religious reasons. Of
course, if the religious practice was so demonstrably dangerous, then there
was a compelling state-interest for proscribing the conduct and it could still
be regulated under the substantive neutrality rule. This is the argument
made by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Smith, where she wrote:
I would conclude that uniform application of Oregon’s
criminal prohibition is “essential to accomplish” its
overriding interest in preventing the physical harm caused by
the use of a Schedule I controlled substance . . . . Because the
health effects caused by the use of controlled substances exist
regardless of the motivation of the user, the use of such
substances, even for religious purposes, violates the very
purpose of the laws that prohibit them. Moreover, in view of
the societal interest in preventing trafficking in controlled
substances, uniform application of the criminal prohibition at
issue is essential to the effectiveness of Oregon’s stated
interest in preventing any possession of peyote.265
Thus, by applying substantive neutrality, Justice O’Connor gets the
same result as the Court does, but under a different form of analysis: she
recognized that the law imposed a burden on the religious adherents but
concluded that the state’s interest in regulating was nonetheless sufficiently
compelling to impose such a burden. Her analysis is predicated on the
important role that states play in policing illegal drug use. It is conceivable
that if the conduct at issue were something other than illegal drug use
(male circumcision perhaps), Justice O’Connor’s rule would have led her
to a different result than that reached by the Court.
By tweaking the facts in Lukumi slightly, we can also consider how the
263

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text (“Justice Scalia, rejected Smith’s argument . . .
that the Free Exercise Clause required a religious-conduct exemption [for himself] from an otherwise
valid law.”).
265
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
264
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result would have differed under a substantive neutrality rule. Recall that
in Lukumi, the Court struck down the four ordinances at issue because they
were neither neutral nor generally applicable. If the ordinances had been
written without the problems identified by the Court—namely if the city
council did not have as its objective banishing Santeria from Hialeah—and
if the ordinances were not written to apply only to religious sacrifice, the
result would potentially have been different. In our hypothetical, under
Justice Scalia’s formal neutrality rule from Smith, the claimants in Lukumi
would have lost because a truly neutral and generally applicable statute
forbidding the slaughter of animals within the city would not violate the
Free Exercise Clause.
However, analyzing the same hypothetical statute under substantive
neutrality, the analysis is more nuanced and the outcome less certain.266
Since our hypothetical lacks the exemptions and narrow definitions of the
Lukumi ordinances, it is a law of general application. However, the
hypothetical statute would not be substantively neutral because it creates a
disincentive for engaging in religious conduct, to wit, the ritual sacrifice of
animals in accordance with Santeria. (The disincentive is whatever the
punishment is for violating the hypothetical rule, presumably a fine and/ or
imprisonment.)
The second step is to consider whether there is a compelling state
interest in applying the ban to the Santeria religious adherents. Whether or
not such an interest exists would turn on what the state claims are its
interests in promulgating the regulation. The Court in Lukumi found no
compelling interest existed because the state’s purported interest—the safe
and sanitary disposal of animals—could be achieved in a more narrowly
tailored way without targeting the Santeria faith.267 Moreover, even if the
state did have a valid purpose in legislating in this field, it was undermined
by the under-inclusiveness of the law, which was written to only apply to
Santeria adherents.268 Under the hypothetical law described above, these
flaws are not present, so the Court could find that the state does have a
compelling interest in applying its regulation to the Santeria adherents.
Still, it seems that the City of Hialeah would be able to regulate animal
slaughter in a more narrowly tailored way. For example, it could impose
regulations and penalties for the unclean disposal of animal carcasses
without actually banning ritual sacrifice. Thus, perhaps the hypothetical
law is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive under a strict scrutiny
analysis.
266
Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lukumi, where he advocates for the substantive neutrality rule,
see supra notes 224–229 and accompanying text, does not explain how he would have applied that rule
to the facts of that case.
267
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1998).
268
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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B. Compelling Interest Test
Once we accept substantive neutrality as the proper way to
conceptualize the neutrality requirement, we could only conclude that the
San Francisco proposal is not substantively neutral because it creates a
disincentive against engaging in religious conduct: criminal prosecution
and financial sanction. Thus, the ballot measure can only be saved if it can
be justified by a compelling state interest.269 The compelling interest test
places a high bar on state interference with religious conduct; in Lukumi,
the Court referred to it as “the most rigorous of scrutiny.”270
Cases where the Court has used the compelling interest test to strike
down laws that threatened religious liberty are instructive.271 In Sherbert,
the Court held that protecting the state’s unemployment fund from spurious
religious claims was not a sufficiently compelling reason to deny the
claimant unemployment compensation.272 Similarly, in Yoder, the Court
found that the state’s interest in ensuring that all students were educated
was not sufficiently compelling to impose upon the Amish religious
practice a requirement that Amish children attend school through age
sixteen.273 Finally, in Lukumi, the Court found that because the ordinances
were under-inclusive by not regulating analogous secular conduct, they
could not survive review under the compelling interest test.274 Under a
substantive neutrality rule (which is what the Court essentially applied in
Sherbert and Yoder), these laws would fail because they force religious
adherents to make the unconscionable choice between following their
religious tradition or facing state sanction—without there being compelling
state interest necessitating that choice be made.275 Substantive neutrality,
unlike formal or object neutrality, would require such an interest when the
state attempts to place a roadblock in front of religious practice.
269
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32 (stating that a law that is not neutral and not generally
applicable “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest”).
270
Id. at 546.
271
One additional case where the Court used the compelling interest test to uphold a substantively
unneutral law requires mention. In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986), the Court
denied an Orthodox Jewish man who wished to wear a yarmulke with his military uniform an
exemption from the Army’s dress code. Even if the result in Goldman does not seem right (for
example, was the military’s interest in conformity sufficiently compelling?), the analysis the Court
applied continued to show deference to the religious practice through its embrace of substantive
neutrality.
272
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
273
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).
274
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
275
Even under the substantive neutrality advocated for by this Note, laws burdening religious
practice will not be upheld where there is a compelling state interest in outlawing the practice. For
example, a law outlawing the hypothetical religious practice of stoning “disobedient women” would be
upheld (even though it is not substantively neutral) because the state has a compelling interest in
policing domestic violence and protecting women.
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Supporters of a ban on male circumcision argue that there is a
compelling interest to justify such an infringement on religious liberty,
although they do not explain why the ban (even if rational) is compelling.
As one writer observed: “It is no longer necessary to demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest in order to uphold the constitutionality of
such laws, although such an interest is present in the case of
circumcision.”276 Similarly, Chessler simply writes, “[t]he government . . .
maintains a compelling interest in protecting children from harmful
religious practices,”277 without demonstrating why the government’s
interest in legislating is sufficiently compelling.
Contrary to what the critics charge, there is no compelling interest that
justifies upholding the San Francisco proposal. The medical evidence that
circumcision is harmful or dangerous to men is inconclusive at best,
although the weight of the evidence suggests that circumcision has many
positive medical benefits.278 However, the key point to infer from the lack
of consensus (to the extent such a lack of consensus in fact exists within
the medical community) is that it cannot possibly be as dangerous to
children as the Inactivist community suggests. Surely if the procedure led
to the “parade of horribles” the Inactivists claim, the procedure would have
been abandoned long ago. Thus, given that the procedure has not been
shown to be demonstrably harmful to children, the state’s interest in
imposing the circumcision ban is not sufficiently compelling. Therefore,
the proposal would fail when subjected to a rigorous strict scrutiny
analysis.
But, assuming for the sake of argument that the medical evidence
conclusively proved circumcision’s harmful health consequences, the
proposal would then still need to be balanced against the deprivation of
religious liberty to survive the constitutional challenge. The Court’s
reasoning in Yoder is instructive on this point: Even if there are some
health consequences to circumcision (just as there are invariably some
negative consequences to ending a child’s education at age sixteen), are
they so compelling as to justify the state denying religious adherents the
right to continue a centuries-old religious tradition?279 The lack of
276

Povenmire, supra note 50, 117–18 (footnote omitted).
Chessler, supra note 29, at 598.
278
See supra Part II.C. (discussing the medical debate over circumcision).
279
In his dissenting opinion in Yoder, Justice Douglas considered the problem that a parent’s
decision not to send his children to school was a decision having permanent, irrevocable consequences.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is the future of the
student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. If a parent keeps his child
out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the new and
amazing world of diversity that we have today . . . . If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those
in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.”).
The decision of parents to circumcise their children, similarly, is a choice that is permanent and cannot
be undone. To some, this is a rationale for upholding the San Francisco circumcision ban (assuming it
277
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consensus among medical experts concerning circumcision—and the
plausible medical benefits gained from the procedure—demonstrate that
this is simply not the case.
In addition to making medical arguments to justify the ban, Inactivists
commonly compare male circumcision to female circumcision,280 arguing
that it does not make sense to ban one but not the other. Under the
compelling state interest test, however, this comparison falls apart.
Chessler, for example, writes, “Claims that [male and female circumcision]
cannot be linked perpetuates the continued legitimacy of one human rights
abuse, male circumcision, through the condemnation of another. An
analogy must be made between the two; regardless of whether a child is
male or female, neither should be subject to genital mutilation.”281
At least one religion (Islam) holds female circumcision out as a
religious obligation;282 a hypothetical law banning it would be generally
applicable, but not substantively neutral. But, while male circumcision has
some plausible medical consequences (and many more medical benefits),
female circumcision is much more serious and devastating to the
woman.283 Female circumcision often involves the removal of the entire
clitoris,284 whereas male circumcision involves the removal of just the
foreskin surrounding the head of the penis. The equivalent male version
of female circumcision would be the removal of the entire head of the
penis. Also, the purposes of the two procedures differ. Whereas
circumcised males are still able to enjoy sexual activity, the removal of a
woman’s clitoris has the object of denying her sexual pleasure. For these
reasons, a ban on male circumcision could not be justified under the
compelling interest test, whereas an identical ban on female circumcision
was approved). Under the proposal, those men who choose to be circumcised may do so of their own
volition at age eighteen, the age of majority in the United States. However, this rationale would not be
a sufficiently compelling basis for trampling on the religious practice of circumcision. As noted above,
in the Jewish faith, circumcision must occur on the eighth day of life, save a few minor exceptions.
Thus, leaving the choice to men at age eighteen would gravely trample upon the religious practice (just
as compulsory school attendance laws trampled upon Amish religious practice). More globally, parents
make thousands, if not more, irrevocable decisions on behalf of their children. Thus, singling out this
decision for disparate treatment would not only fail the substantive neutrality principle, but quite
possibly would violate the less accommodating formal neutrality rule.
280
See, e.g., Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64
(comparing female circumcision to male circumcision).
281
Chessler, supra note 29, at 612.
282
Islam appears to be the only religion to embrace that custom as part of its religious tradition.
See Chessler, supra note 29, at 581–83 (discussing female circumcision in the Islamic tradition);
Povenmire, supra note 50, 114–15 (“Many Muslims believe that the tenets of their faith require
surgery, although this is contested by some Islamic scholars.” (footnote omitted)).
283
Some of the complications that may result from female circumcision include bleeding,
infection, pain, urinary tract infections, scarring, cysts and sexual and physiological side effects.
Chessler, supra note 29, at 562–63.
284
Id. at 561; Povenmire, supra note 50, at 115.
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is easily justifiable.
C. Hybrid Claim
The decision in Smith suggested that the only cases where a claim
under the Free Exercise Clause had been vindicated were “hybrid
situation[s]” involving not just a free exercise claim but also a claim
connected to a constitutionally protected communicative activity or
parental right.285 Thus, the Smith Court characterized Yoder not as a free
exercise case286 but as a case concerning a parent’s right to direct the
religious upbringing of his or her children.287 The Court held in Smith that
no such hybrid claim was raised because the activity in question, peyote
use for religious conduct, did not implicate either communicative or
parental rights.288
Circumcising children as a matter of religious tradition involves both
communicative and parental rights.
1. Communicative Activity
As an example of a communicative right connected to a free exercise
case, the Smith Court cited289 the statute invalidated in Cantwell v.
Connecticut.290 In Cantwell, the Court struck down a licensing system for
religious and charitable organizations under which an administrator had
discretion to deny a license to any cause deemed non-religious.291
Likewise, for those who perform circumcision as a matter of religious
obligation, there is significant communicative value associated with their
conduct. In Judaism and Islam, circumcision is a way of identifying
Emp’t Div., Dept’ of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
Id. at 881 n.1 (stating that both cases dealing with communicative or parental rights have
“adverted to the non-free-exercise principle involved”).
287
Id. For this proposition, the Court cited to Yoder’s reliance on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
US. 510 (1925), which held that parents had the right to direct the education of their children by
choosing between public and private schools. Justice Souter disputed the Court’s reliance on Pierce in
Smith to classify Yoder as a hybrid rights case. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566–67 n.4 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting that the Yoder Court’s characterization of Pierce as “inapplicable” and stating that
the State’s actions must be justified under the Free Exercise Clause). McConnell also criticizes this
false distinction, noting that Yoder held that parents may not violate the compulsory attendance law for
non-religious reasons. “Thus, according to Yoder parents have no right independent of the Free
Exercise Clause to withhold their children from school, and according to Smith they have no such right
under the Free Exercise Clause.” McConnell, supra note 218, at 1121.
288
Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lukumi argued that the hybrid
distinction, while unnecessary, would cover the situation in Smith, since taking peyote under the facts
of that case involved communicative and associational rights. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
289
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
290
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
291
Id. at 304–07.
285
286
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oneself as a member of the religion. A government ban on circumcision
would be equivalent to banning jewelry without an exception for crosses,
or banning head coverings without an exception for the Muslim headscarf.
All of these activities involve religious acts that have significant
communicative and associational value, raising both free speech and free
exercise claims.
2. Parental Rights293
The second type of hybrid claim that the Court acknowledged in Smith
was a claim implicating the parental right to raise one’s children without
state inference, as the Court recognized in Yoder.294
According to Smith:
Yoder said that “the Court’s holding in Pierce stands as a
charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious
upbringing of their children. And, when the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the
nature revealed by the record, more than merely a
‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s
requirement under the First Amendment.”295
Applying the holding in Yoder to the San Francisco proposal, the latter
implicates a parent’s right to direct his or her child’s upbringing296 by
denying the right to welcome his sons into the chosen faith through a
centuries-old tradition. And, specifically with regard to medical decisions
(the decision to circumcise a child or not is a medical one), the Court has
recognized a parent’s right to make decisions about his or her children’s

292
See, e.g., Aryeh Citron, The Mitzvah Circumcision (Part I), CHABAD.ORG,
http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1014930/jewish/The-Mitzvah-of-Circumcision-PartI.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2012) (referring to circumcision as “a sign, affixed in our flesh, that we are
believers in the one G[o]d”); see also supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing male
circumcision as a form of expressive conduct in the Jewish religion).
293
This Note focuses on religious exemptions to the San Francisco proposal. There is also an
argument, only partially developed here, that parents have a right regardless of religious prerogative to
make decisions for their children. For a discussion of that argument, see Eugene Volokh, Proposed
San Francisco Circumcision Ban (with No Discussion of Religious Freedom in this Post), supra note
51.
294
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (recognizing the rights of parents, acknowledged in Pierce, to
direct the education of their children).
295
Id. at 881 n.1 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).
296
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that a state law
requiring that parents enroll their children in public school through age sixteen “unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control”).
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medical care.
Thus, given the plausible medical reasons for
circumcision (reduced urinary infection, and reduced risk of penile cancer
and HIV/AIDS298), and absent some compelling medical evidence of the
procedure’s harmful effects (presently none exists), the normal
presumption of parental deference applies, and parents have the right to
make this medical decision for their children.
Inactivists argue, relying on Prince,299 that even if parents have the
right to direct their children’s religious and medical upbringing, they do
not have the right “to make martyrs of their children.”300 While it is true
that the parental right to direct a child’s upbringing is not limitless,301 the
test the Court has developed accounts for this limitation. Under the
compelling interest test, a parent’s right to raise his or her child is balanced
against the potential harm to the child by following the parent’s religious
choice.
In our case, there is a world of difference between denying a child
lifesaving medical treatment and allowing him to be circumcised as a
member of a religious faith. As noted several times before, the harm of
circumcision has not been conclusively established, and there are many
plausible medical benefits derived from the procedure. Even as there
exists some debate within the medical community about the efficacy of
circumcision, the charge that boys are “martyred” by circumcision is
nothing more than hyperbole of the worst sort. As the discussion above
shows, instances of death as a result of circumcision are practically nonexistent.302 Therefore, the ordinary presumption of parental deference
applies, and the parental right to raise one’s child enjoined with the free
exercise right to practice one’s religion is applicable in requiring an
exemption for religious followers to a circumcision ban.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has considered one aspect of the tension between liberal
democracy and religious freedom. For laws to have any significance,
citizens must not disregard them at will. And yet, the essence of religious
liberty requires that believers enjoy some modicum of accommodation
when their faith’s practices conflict with generally applicable laws. This
297
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (holding that parents have a role in their
children’s medical decisions with the presumption that parents will act in their children’s best interest).
298
See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
299
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“The right to practice religion freely
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child . . . to ill health or death.”).
300
Id. at 170.
301
See Parham, 442 U.S. at 604 (“We also conclude, however, that the child's rights and the
nature of the commitment decision are such that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable
discretion to decide whether to have a child institutionalized.”).
302
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Note has considered this tension in the context of the proposal in San
Francisco to ban male circumcision, and has argued for the adoption of one
theory that partially resolves this tension.
This Note argued that the San Francisco proposal does not comport
with the values of religious liberty, as defined by the Court’s
jurisprudence, and therefore it should not be upheld pursuant to the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. While the proposal is generally
applicable, it is not neutral because it dis-incentivizes religious followers
from engaging in certain conduct, here, infant male circumcision.
Admittedly the Court’s definition of neutrality is in flux. Thus, more
significant perhaps than whether the proposal is neutral is how the Court
conceptualizes the neutrality requirement. This Note argued that the Court
should adopt substantive neutrality as the fullest embodiment of religious
liberty. However, under the Court’s present understanding of the neutrality
requirement—formal and object neutrality—the ballot measure would be
found to be neutral and therefore upheld. But a nation as committed to
religious liberty as ours should not accept the mere absence of hostility as
the ceiling for our religious liberties; that is just the floor.
If substantive neutrality is how neutrality is understood, this proposal
could not stand (at least to the extent that it would apply to Jews and
Muslims in the exercise of their religious practices). Rightly, the Court
applies strict scrutiny when a state deprives its citizens of the fundamental
right to engage in religious conduct. No compelling state interest has been
shown, nor could be shown, that would justify this proposal. Moreover,
religious observers seeking an exemption have a solid hybrid claim, as the
proposal implicates both communicative and parental rights.
Adopting a substantive neutrality rule is consistent with religious
liberty and does not violate the Establishment Clause. Substantive
neutrality—that is, requiring the government to provide neutral incentives
and disincentives for religious conduct—offers the greatest amount of
protection for religious adherents that our Constitution could provide.
Liberty does not just mean the right to believe in something; it also
includes the concomitant right to act upon that belief. A rule that holds
formal neutrality sufficient to meet the constitutional threshold is itself
insufficient because it fails to account for those occasions where
governmental action has an incidental deleterious effect on religious
conduct.
This Note began by presenting the concept of a “friendly” separation
of church and state. Perhaps such a separation requires mere formal or
object neutrality: If the government is not hostile to religion, then it is
acting neutrally and its regulations would be constitutional. But our
Constitution and the cause of religious liberty demand more. Put simply,
the government should not be in the business of picking winners and losers
in the religious marketplace.

